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ABSTRACT 
The United States prides itself on freedom of speech and information.  However, foreign adversaries have 
weaponized these prized freedoms against the United States. The First Amendment, the Privacy Act, and other 
U.S. laws designed to protect Americans’ civil liberties paradoxically constrain the United States’ ability to combat 
information warfare by its enemies. This Article argues that the United States must reform laws and doctrine 
concerning speech, information, and privacy to protect the democratic process and national security.  By exploring 
the example of the Russian threat to the U.S. electoral process, this Article will illustrate how foreign adversaries 
wield the United States’ own laws against it.  It will also explain how justifiable concerns with infringement on 
civil liberties have hindered the United States’ response.  The Article concludes with recommendations on how 
courts, legislatures, and policymakers should balance First Amendment and privacy rights with national security 
interests to combat information warfare. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States prides itself on freedom of speech and information.  
However, Russia and other foreign actors have weaponized these freedoms 
against the United States.  Most famously, before the 2016 presidential 
election, Russia used online sources disguised as news outlets to produce and 
distribute fake news, targeting voters in swing states.1  Russia then interfered 
in the 2018 midterm elections and is attempting to influence the 2020 
Presidential election.2  Iran, North Korea, and China are also engaging in 
coordinated campaigns aimed at spreading disinformation3 to alter political 
discourse.4  The Islamic State, too, has successfully used social media to shape 
public opinion and the narrative of its conflict with the United States.5  
According to the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), foreign-influenced 
 
 1 Philip M. Napoli, What If More Speech Is No Longer the Solution? First Amendment Theory Meets Fake News 
and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 76 (2018); Natasha Korecki, ‘Sustained and Ongoing’ 
Disinformation Assault Targets Dem Presidential Candidates, POLITICO (Feb. 20, 2019, 6:05 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/20/2020-candidates-social-media-attack-1176018. 
 2 Josh Gerstein, U.S. Brings First Charge for Meddling in 2018 Midterm Elections, POLITICO (Oct. 19, 2018, 
2:32 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/19/first-criminal-case-filed-over-russian-
interference-in-2018-midterms-916787. 
 3 Disinformation is false information that is deliberately and often covertly spread to influence public 
opinion whereas misinformation is incorrect or misleading information that is inadvertently sent 
that influences public opinion.  
 4 Press Release, Daniel R. Coats, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, 
DNI Coats Statement on the Intelligence Community’s Response to Executive Order 13848 on 
Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election (Dec. 
21, 2018), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/1933-dni-coats-
statement-on-the-intelligence-community-s-response-to-executive-order-13848-on-imposing-certa
in-sanctions-in-the-event-of-foreign-interference-in-a-united-states-election; see also PRESIDENT 
DONALD TRUMP, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 35 
(2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-
0905.pdf [hereinafter NSS 2017] (citing China and Russia’s use of information against Americans 
online); Alina Polyakova & Daniel Fried, Democratic Defense Against Disinformation 2.0, ATLANTIC 
COUNCIL, June 2019, at 2 (arguing that exposing disinformation campaigns is not enough to 
combat them); Emily Birnbaum, Twitter Releases Archive of Iran, Russia-Linked Misinformation Campaigns, 
THE HILL (June 13, 2019, 10:30 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/448341-twitter-
releases-archive-of-iran-russia-linked-misinformation-campaigns (reporting Twitter’s release of 
archival tweets relating to Iran and Russia-linked misinformation campaigns); Arya Goel et al., 
Managing and Mitigating Foreign Election Interference, LAWFARE (July 21, 2019, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/managing-and-mitigating-foreign-election-interference (noting 
that Russia has targeted 19 different countries and the activities of Iran, China, and Saudi Arabia). 
 5 William Marcellino et al., Monitoring Social Media: Lessons for Future Department of Defense Social Media 
Analysis in Support of Information Operations, RAND CORP., at 15 (2017), https://www.rand.org/
pubs/research_reports/RR1742.html.  
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operations like Russia’s include covert actions intended to “sow division in 
our society, undermine confidence in [ ] democratic institutions, and 
otherwise affect political sentiment and public discourse to achieve strategic 
geopolitical objectives.”6  Indeed, Russia’s disinformation campaigns spurred 
a national argument over the legitimacy of the U.S. electoral system and how 
the United States should respond.7  The 2017 U.S. National Security 
Strategy repeatedly notes that the threat of information warfare by Russia 
and China is likely to continue and that the United States’ response has been 
“tepid and fragmented.”8  
One reason for this weak response is that U.S. laws and jurisprudence 
protecting free speech and privacy were not designed for the technological 
realities of today.  Much First Amendment doctrine is premised on an 
idealized public square containing a marketplace of ideas.  The Supreme 
Court has even called the Internet “the modern public square.”9  However, 
this metaphor is inapt for today’s social media environment, where private 
entities control the conditions in which speech is made and heard. 
Moreover, many laws that prevent the U.S. Government from collecting 
data on U.S. persons’ First Amendment activities far predate the Internet.10  
Many of these laws were developed in the 1970s, in the context of fears of 
U.S. Government overreach during the Cold War.  They were intended to 
legally and morally distinguish U.S. Government actions from the Soviets’, 
who surveilled and propagandized their own people.11  These laws remain 
 
 6 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CYBER DIGITAL TASK FORCE 
1 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1076696/download [hereinafter CYBER DIGITAL 
TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
 7 Id.; see also NSS 2017, supra note 4, at 14, 34 (pointing to America’s competitors’ use of information 
to attack American institutions and values).  
 8 NSS 2017, supra note 4, at 35. 
 9 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). 
 10 This Article defines a U.S. person as “any United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent 
residence in the United States, and any corporation, partnership, or other organization organized 
under the laws of the United States.”  22 U.S.C. § 6010 (2017).  
 11 For example, the Soviet Union engaged in disinformation campaigns against the United States 
notably in the 1950s, focusing on the country’s systemic racism, and in the 1980s, claiming that 
AIDS was created by American biological weapons experimentation.  See Ashley Deeks et al., 
Addressing Russian Influence: What Can We Learn From U.S. Cold War Counter-Propaganda Efforts?, 
LAWFARE (Oct. 25, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/addressing-russian-influence-
what-can-we-learn-us-cold-war-counter-propaganda-efforts (detailing Soviet use of disinformation 
campaigns to highlight or exaggerate problems in America); Seth G. Jones, Russian Meddling in the 
United States: The Historical Context of the Mueller Report, CSIS (Mar. 27, 2019), 
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critical to protect civil liberties and curtail abuses of government power.  
However, the drafters of those laws could not foresee that, years later, Russia 
would surveil Americans’ Internet data and weaponize it against the United 
States, while the U.S. Government would be barred from accessing its own 
people’s data to fight back. 
An example from 2016 acutely illustrates how U.S. laws constrain the 
country’s ability to combat information warfare.  In 2016, the State 
Department (“DOS”) proposed to identify social media influencers who were 
spreading Kremlin messages and target them with counterarguments.12  
However, the Privacy Act of 1974 restricts data collection related to the ways 
Americans exercise their First Amendment rights.  The proposed program 
could not guarantee that it would not inadvertently collect American citizens’ 
data, and the DOS program did not fall under the Act’s law-enforcement 
exceptions.  State Department lawyers quashed the program, reasoning that 
tweets, retweets, and comments implicate the collection of data related to the 
ways Americans exercise their First Amendment rights.  The State 
Department lawyers thus reasoned that the First Amendment prohibited a 
program that would have encouraged the First Amendment right to free 
political debate by adding political speech to the marketplace of ideas.13  
In this and other ways, the United States’ own laws tie its hands in its 
fight against information warfare.  For this reason, developing, updating, and 
deconflicting the laws regulating information operations is a high 
 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-meddling-united-states-historical-context-mueller-report 
(arguing that Russia engaged in attempts to influence U.S. elections during the Cold War).  Also, 
during this time period, the U.S. intelligence community frequently violated Americans’ civil 
liberties, which eventually led to the formation of the Church Committee.  See, e.g., Americo R. 
Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 806–07 (1989) (detailing congressional inquiries into 
intelligence agencies that uncovered privacy infringements post-Watergate).  
 12 See Adam Entous et al., Kremlin Trolls Burned Across the Internet as Washington Debated Options, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kremlin-trolls-
burned-across-the-internet-as-washington-debated-options/2017/12/23/e7b9dc92-e403-11e7-ab
50-621fe0588340_story.html (detailing the proposed CIA action of creating fake websites and 
personas to fight back against Kremlin trolls).  
 13 Cf. Jamie Condliffe, The Week in Tech: Disinformation’s Huge Inaction Problem, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/31/technology/facebook-disinformation-nancy-
pelosi.html (“[L]awmakers worry about running afoul of the First Amendment . . . .”).  
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government priority.14  This Article argues that the United States must 
reform laws, doctrine, and policies to protect national security and the 
democratic process.  First Amendment jurisprudence and the Privacy Act, in 
particular, pose substantial obstacles to a whole-of-government approach in 
fighting the Russian disinformation campaign and information warfare more 
broadly.  
Fortunately, solutions to this critical First Amendment problem can be 
found within First Amendment jurisprudence itself.15  The First Amendment 
remains the paramount American constitutional freedom.  The Article does 
not argue that the First Amendment is outdated or should be changed.  
Instead, the Article argues that the First Amendment must be reinterpreted 
to continue to protect the values embedded within it.  Free and fair elections 
are the foundation of democratic governance.  For this reason, courts give 
primacy to political speech.  Yet, the threat of information warfare now 
requires reconceptualizing political speech for the Internet era to protect 
American democracy.  Judges, legislators, and policymakers must carefully 
balance constitutional rights with national security concerns so as not to 
infringe upon fundamental American freedoms.  
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I will outline how foreign 
adversaries have waged information warfare against the United States, using 
the example of Russian information operations targeting the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election, the most widely-known example of information warfare 
against the United States.16  Part II will explain how First Amendment 
doctrine, the Privacy Act, and related laws constrain the United States’ 
ability to fight information warfare.  The Article will argue that Supreme 
Court doctrine involving the public square, counterspeech, and falsehoods is 
 
 14 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., STRATEGY FOR OPERATIONS IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 13 
(2016), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD-Strategy-for-Operations-in-
the-IE-Signed-20160613.pdf. 
 15 See Polyakova & Fried, supra note 4, at 3 (“Freedom of expression and US First Amendment 
protections do not rob free societies of options.”).  
 16 NSS 2017, supra note 4, at 14, 34;  Press Release, Daniel R. Coats, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Office 
of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Coats Statement on the Intelligence Community’s Response 
to Executive Order 13848 on Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in 
a United States Election (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-
releases/item/1933-dni-coats-statement-on-the-intelligence-community-s-response-to-executive-o
rder-13848-on-imposing-certain-sanctions-in-the-event-of-foreign-interference-in-a-united-states-
election. 
 
November 2019] THE NEW FIGHTING WORDS? 87 
   
 
inadequate for the realities of online political discourse.17  It will further argue 
that Cold War-era privacy laws now pose an enormous hurdle to the United 
States’  ability to combat Russia’s information warfare.  Part IV will outline 
doctrinal, legislative, and policy solutions to enable the United States to fight 
information warfare while preserving civil liberties.  It will argue that current 
Supreme Court precedent can be extended to protect the electoral process 
and regulate foreign speech, and certain other speech, accordingly.  The 
Article will then propose legal reforms, legislation, and new policies to 
combat three major tactics of election-related Russian information warfare: 
paid advertisements, fake news, and divisive propaganda.  It will also 
evaluate past proposals for self-regulation by online platforms and social 
media outlets.18  Finally, the Article will conclude by discussing the 
implications of this analysis for the United States’ fight against information 
warfare and the appropriate balance between civil liberties and national 
security more generally. 
This Article will discuss how the United States can combat information 
warfare through a whole-of-government approach, with a focus on civilian 
government agencies.  A thorough discussion of U.S. military operations 
concerning information warfare involves additional legal authorities, 
including classified information, and lies beyond the scope of this paper.19  
However, the framework in this Article is relevant for employing and 
combatting information operations.  Information operations are increasingly 
used by the U.S. military and its adversaries both during and outside the 
sphere of armed conflict.  U.S. military information operations and 
surveillance activities—especially when the military operates in cooperation 
 
 17 This Article considers social media companies as “information content provider[s]” because of their 
partial responsibility for the “creation or development of information provided through the Internet 
. . . .” Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2017).  The Communications 
Decency Act was Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, §§ 501-
61, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43 (codified as amended in sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 18 Following common practice by courts and legislatures, this Article defines “online platform” as “any 
public-facing Internet Web site, Web application, or digital application, including a social network 
or publication, that has 10,000,000 or more unique monthly United States visitors or users for a 
majority of months during the preceding 12 months.”  Some courts and statutes have reduced the 
number of users required to meet this definition. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17940(c) (2018). 
 19 For additional legal authorities relevant to the military’s response to information warfare, see 
generally JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUB. 3-12, CYBERSPACE 
OPERATIONS (June 8, 2018) (providing “joint doctrine to plan, execute, and assess cyberspace 
operations”).  
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with civilian agencies—must comply with the same constitutional principles 
discussed in this Article and would employ similar tools to combat 
misinformation and propaganda campaigns.  
I.  HOW INFORMATION WARFARE WEAPONIZES THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A.  The Information Warfare Threat: The 2016 Russian Disinformation Campaign 
Unable to match the United States in conventional warfare, its enemies 
have turned to stealthier and less costly disinformation campaigns.20  Russia  
engaged in a multi-year, coordinated disinformation effort through its state-
sponsored Internet Research Agency (“IRA”).  The campaign’s goal was to 
exert political influence and exacerbate social divisions within the United 
States.21  Russian information warfare adopts a guerrilla or “firehose of 
 
 20 YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND 
RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 24 (2018) (defining misinformation as “publishing 
wrong information without meaning to be wrong or having a political purpose in communicating 
false information” and disinformation as “manipulating and misleading people intentionally to 
achieve political ends”).  
 21 NEW KNOWLEDGE, THE TACTICS & TROPES OF THE INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY  4 (2018), 
https://disinformationreport.blob.core.windows.net/disinformation-report/NewKnowledge-Disi
nformation-Report-Whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT]; see also BENKLER 
ET AL., supra note 20, at 237 (noting the origins of Russian state-sponsored information campaigns 
against opponents).  While this Article cites the New Knowledge Report, it is important to recognize 
that those concerned about foreign disinformation campaigns are not impervious to conducting 
their own.  The chief executive of New Knowledge, Jonathon Moore, was reportedly involved in a 
project that engaged in deceptive tactics in the Alabama Senate race between Doug Jones and Roy 
S. Moore.  See, e.g., Scott Shane & Alan Blinder, Secret Experiment in Alabama Senate Race Imitated Russian 
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/alabama-senate-
roy-jones-russia.html.  The project involved operators “pos[ing] as conservative Alabamians, using 
it to try to divide Republicans” and engaging in false-flag operations. Morgan claimed that the 
project was an “experiment” and not designed “to affect the election.” Id.  Whether or not that is 
true, it is clear that Americans may seek to engage in disinformation tactics.  See Emily Birnbaum 
& Olivia Beavers, Americans Mimic Russian Disinformation Tactics Ahead of 2020, HILL (May 8, 2019, 
6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/442620-americans-mimic-russian-disinforma
tion-tactics-ahead-of-2020 (reporting “both right-wing and liberal trolls engage in disinformation 
campaigns designed to undermine 2020 presidential candidates”); Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 
202: Disinformation Spread by Americans is ‘the Hardest Challenge That We Have,’ DHS Official Says, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-
technology-202/2019/04/12/the-technology-202-disinformation-spread-by-americans-is-the-har
dest-challenge-that-we-have-dhs-official-says/5caf9cf91ad2e567949ec16c/?noredirect=on&utm_
term=.64331b7d0203 (describing disinformation spread by Americans as the hardest challenge 
government faces).  
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falsehood” approach,22 called the Gerasimov Doctrine.  The Doctrine 
proposes that Russia can defeat its enemies through a “combination of 
political, economic, informational, technological, and ecological 
campaigns.”23  The Doctrine advocates using non-military tactics over 
conventional warfare to achieve political and strategic goals.24  Three 
distinctive features characterize the model:  (1) engaging in a high number of 
platforms, (2) producing rapid, continuous, repetitive floods of messaging, 
and (3) disseminating partial truths or outright lies, whether or not they are 
consistent with one another.25  Russia’s disinformation campaign functions 
by trying thousands of tactics until one succeeds.  
The Gerasimov Doctrine’s foundations play on human psychology.  First 
impressions are incredibly resilient:  an individual is more likely to accept and 
favor the first information she receives on a topic when encountering 
conflicting messages.26  Research demonstrates that people are likely to 
remember information, or how they feel about that information, but forget 
the context in which they learned it.27  If a user receives misinformation first, 
she is likely to believe that misinformation, even if she encounters the true 
information later.  Also, receiving a message from multiple media types and 
multiple sources increases its perceived credibility.  This repetitive feature of 
the Russian “firehose” model breeds familiarity, which leads to acceptance.28  
Termed the illusory truth effect, people “rate statements as more truthful, 
valid, and believable when they have encountered those statements 
 
 22 Christopher Paul & Miriam Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model: Why it 
Might Work and Options to Counter It, RAND CORP. 1 (2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/
perspectives/PE198.html. 
 23 Peter Pomerantsev, Inside the Kremlin’s Hall of Mirrors, GUARDIAN (Apr. 9, 2015, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/apr/09/kremlin-hall-of-mirrors-military-information
-psychology.  
 24 Valery Gerasimov, Contemporary Warfare and Current Issues for the Defense of the Country, MIL. REV. 
(Harold Orenstein trans., Nov.–Dec. 2017), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/
7/military-review/Archives/English/Contemporary-Warfare-and-Current-Issues-for-the-Defens
e-of-the-Country.pdf.; Ben Sohl, Influence Campaigns and the Future of International Competition, 
REALCLEAR DEFENSE (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/
2017/09/12/influence_campaigns_and_international_competition_112280.html.  
 25 Paul & Matthews, supra note 22, at 1.  
 26 Id. at 4.   
 27 David M. J. Lazer et al., The Science of Fake News, 359 SCIENCE 1094, 1095 (2018), 
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/359/6380/1094/full/pdf.http://science.sciencemag.
org/content/sci/359/6380/1094.full.pdf.  
 28 Paul & Matthews, supra note 22, at 4.  
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previously than when they are new statements.”29  Thus, many Americans 
are susceptible to Russian tactics, which exploit psychological tendencies.  
The IRA intended to polarize and divide the American electorate and to 
normalize viewpoints that were strategically advantageous to Russia.  The 
FBI, CIA, and NSA commissioned the Intelligence Community Assessment 
(“ICA”), a 2017 report to assess Russian activities and intentions in the 2016 
election.30  The report explained that Russian influence campaigns are 
“multifaceted and designed to be deniable because they use a mix of agents 
of influence, cutouts, front organizations, and false-flag operations.”31  The 
influence campaign leading up to the 2016 presidential election blended 
covert intelligence operations with overt efforts “by Russian Government 
agencies, state-funded media, [and] third-party intermediaries. . . .”32  Paid 
trolls also spread propaganda on social media, and in online chat rooms, 
discussion forums, and website comment sections.33  These propagandists 
maintained thousands of fake accounts on online platforms like Twitter and 
Facebook.34  Instagram, in particular, was a target and will continue to be a 
target as many young social media users use the platform.35  Instagram’s 
recommendation algorithm, hashtagging, and sharing stories function made 
it “the most effective platform for the [IRA].”36 
The Russian effort flooded the Internet, especially social media, with 
disinformation.  According to a report commissioned by the Senate 
 
 29 Id.   
 30 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, ICA 2017-01D, BACKGROUND TO “ASSESSING 
RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS”: THE ANALYTIC PROCESS 
AND CYBER INCIDENT ATTRIBUTION, (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.  [hereinafter ICA]. 
 31 Id. at 2.  
 32 Id. at ii.  
 33 Id. at 2.  
 34 Dmitry Volchek & Daisy Sindelar, One Professional Russian Troll Tells All, RADIO FREE EUR.: RADIO 
LIBERTY (Mar. 25, 2015, 11:08 GMT), https://www.rferl.org/a/how-to-guide-russian-trolling-
trolls/26919999.html (discussing a “troll factory” and the assignments given to those who worked 
there). 
 35 Taylor Lorenz, Instagram is the Internet’s New Home for Hate, ATLANTIC (Mar. 21, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/03/instagram-is-the-internets-new-
home-for-hate/585382/ (noting that users of Instagram, which is “teeming with [ ] conspiracy 
theories, viral misinformation and extremist memes,” are very young); see also Paris Martineau, How 
Instagram Became the Russian IRA’s Go-To Social Network, WIRED (Dec. 17, 2018, 1:13 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/how-instagram-became-russian-iras-social-network/ (detailing the 
success of the IRA’s efforts on Instagram). 
 36 NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 26.  
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Intelligence Committee,37 the IRA’s operations from 2013 to 2018 reached 
126 million Facebook users, 20 million Instagram users,38 and 1.4 million 
Twitter users.  The IRA uploaded one thousand videos on YouTube as 
well.39  Between 2015 and 2017, over 30 million users shared Facebook and 
Instagram posts generated by the IRA.40  
The Russian disinformation campaign involved at least three major 
tactics:  (1) paid advertisements, (2) fake news, especially false news stories 
about political candidates, and (3) what we term “divisive propaganda,”41 
which may involve false news stories about other topics or other information 
operations designed to sow discord in American society.  For example, the 
IRA ran polarizing advertisements on dozens of proxy news sites that 
disguised or downplayed their affiliation with Russia.42  IRA accounts were 
registered at various IP addresses so they could pass for accounts of different 
nationalities.  These advertisements targeted all parts of the political 
spectrum and reached, at least, hundreds of thousands of Americans.43  One 
 
 37 PHILIP N. HOWARD ET AL., COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA RESEARCH PROJECT: THE IRA, 
SOCIAL MEDIA AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE U.S., 2012-2018, at 6 (2018), 
https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2018/12/IRA-Report.pdf 
[hereinafter OXFORD REPORT].  
 38 NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 33. 
 39 Id. at 6.  
 40 OXFORD REPORT, supra note 37, at 3; BENKLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 242. 
 41 This Article uses the definition of “propaganda” in the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 611(j) (1942), amended by Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691.  The 
Act defines “political propaganda” to include:  
any oral, visual, graphic, written, pictorial, or other communication or expression by any 
person (1) which is reasonably adapted to, or which the person disseminating the same 
believes will, or which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any 
other way influence a recipient or any section of the public within the United States with 
reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a 
foreign country or a foreign political party or with reference to the foreign policies of the 
United States or promote in the United States racial, religious, or social dissensions, or (2) 
which advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social, political, or religious 
disorder, civil riot, or other conflict involving the use of force or violence in any other 
American republic or the overthrow of any government or political subdivision of any 
other American republic by any means involving the use of force or violence. 
  Definitions of propaganda are not consistent in U.S. laws. 
 42 Paul & Matthews, supra note 25, at 2 (“[T]here are dozens of proxy news sites presenting Russian 
propaganda, but with their affiliation with Russia disguised or downplayed”); see also BENKLER ET 
AL., supra note 20, at 368 (discussing Russia’s use of behavioral marketing techniques to influence 
public opinion).  
 43 Cecilia Kang et al., Russia-Financed Ad Linked Clinton and Satan, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/us/politics/facebook-google-twitter-russian-interference
-hearings.html (noting that Facebook had stated that “an estimated 150 million users of its main 
site and its subsidiary, Instagram, were exposed” to these advertisements). 
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of the earlier instances of fake news produced by the Russian disinformation 
campaign was the September 2014 #ColumbianChemicals hoax.44  The 
campaign, waged by thousands of Russian troll and bot accounts,45 centered 
on an invented explosion at the Columbian Chemicals plant in Louisiana.  
Related disinformation spread across Twitter, Facebook, and Wikipedia, 
backed by digitally altered graphics and pictures.46  Russia also disseminated 
fake news claiming that Hillary Clinton sold weapons to ISIS.47 
The majority of the Russian disinformation campaign involved divisive 
propaganda.  These efforts were designed to sow discord in American 
society, using speech that was sometimes true and sometimes false.  For 
example, IRA efforts on Facebook and Instagram were designed to reinforce 
themes and messages to clearly-identified audiences, such as the political 
Left, Right, and African-American communities.48  Twitter accounts 
provided “largely opportunistic real-time chatter” and were part of a cross-
platform building tactic, linking platform pages with Twitter accounts.49  
Facebook and Instagram were “used to develop deeper relationships” with 
targeted audiences, building pages “dedicated to continual reinforcement of 
in-group and out-group ideals.”50  More than one hundred Twitter accounts 
went as far as to impersonate state and local news enterprises.51  On 
Facebook, the five most-shared and the five most-liked posts focused on gun 
 
 44 Todd C. Helmus et al., Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe, 
RAND CORP. 19 (2018), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/
RR2200/RR2237/RAND_RR2237.pdf (recounting the Columbian Chemicals plant explosion 
hoax).  
 45 This Article defines “bot” as an “automated online account where all or substantially all of the 
actions or posts of that account are not the result of a person.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17940(a) 
(2018). 
 46 Helmus et al., supra note 44, at 18; see also OXFORD REPORT, supra note 37, at 26–27 (describing 
the Columbian Chemical hoax); Adrian Chen, The Agency, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 2, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html (discussing generally the 
propaganda the IRA posted online under fake identities). 
 47 See ICA, supra note 30, at 4 (noting an interview with Julian Assange titled Clinton and ISIS Funded by 
the Same Money); NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 60, 84 (noting that content on right-
leaning Internet pages included statements that Hillary Clinton founded ISIS); Max Boot, Opinion, 
Without the Russians, Trump Wouldn’t Have Won, WASH. POST (July 24, 2018, 6:36 PM), 
https://beta.washingtonpost.com/opinions/without-the-russians-trump-wouldnt-have-won/2018
/07/24/f4c87894-8f6b-11e8-bcd5-9d911c784c38_story.html. 
 48 NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 8.  
 49 Id. at 20.  
 50 Id.   
 51 Id. at 66.  
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ownership, police violence against African-Americans, and anti-immigrant 
sentiment.52  Other divisive posts pitted immigrants against veterans and 
featured messages that were anti-Muslim and anti-President Obama.53  From 
2015 to 2016, much of the divisive messaging sought to benefit then-
presidential candidate Donald Trump.54  
Leading up to the election, the IRA varied its content according to the 
targeted group.  The Agency’s messaging was not always “objectively false,” 
and although it may have been offensive, most of it did not qualify as “hate 
speech.”55  IRA messaging encouraged right-wing groups to support 
Trump’s campaign and to generate anger towards and suspicion of the 
Left.56  IRA messaging repeated patriotic and anti-immigrant slogans and 
attempted to incite outrage about liberal appeasement of ‘others’ at the 
expense of U.S. citizens.57  For example, posted content discussed voter fraud 
and gave warnings on how the election might be stolen.58  This messaging 
directly encouraged votes for Trump.  
The IRA acted specifically to suppress votes of those likely to vote against 
Trump.  Left-wing groups and Black Americans, who were expected to vote 
against Trump, received messaging designed to discourage, confuse, or 
distract them from voting.59  The IRA advanced three major variants of voter 
suppression tactics:  “malicious misdirection,” designed to create confusion 
over voter rules; “candidate support redirection,” designed to change voting 
 
 52 OXFORD REPORT, supra note 37, at 7. 
 53 Id.  
 54 ICA, supra note 30, at 1 (“We further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear 
preference for President-elect Trump.”).  
 55 NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 99.  Building consensus in the legal community on 
a definition for hate speech is unavailing.  See generally Andrew F. Sellars, Defining Hate Speech 24–31 
(Berkman Klein Center, Working Paper No. 2016-20, 2016) (attempting to define hate speech by 
drawing out eight common traits of hate speech definitions).  
 56 NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 83; see also BENKLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 236 
(“Just as terrorism succeeds most when it evokes an overreaction and causes a society to respond 
from fear and anger rather than calculation, so too will Russian active measures have their largest 
effect through evoking a harmful autoimmune response from the countries under attack.”).  The 
“Left” here is used colloquially to refer to liberals and Democrats, as opposed to moderates, 
conservatives, or Republicans.  
 57 OXFORD REPORT, supra note 37, at 19.  
 58 NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 81 (describing voter suppression tactics employed by 
the IRA in the days leading up to the election).  
 59 OXFORD REPORT, supra note 37, at 19; BENKLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 240 (“The core strategy 
. . . was to increase disaffection, distrust, and polarization in American politics.”). 
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patterns; and “turnout depression.”60  To illustrate, the IRA advanced the 
message that voters should boycott the election because the candidates do 
not care about Black people.61  The messaging preyed on societal anger with 
structural inequalities, police violence, and disproportionate levels of 
incarceration.62  When it came to messaging directed at the Left, the IRA 
sought to promote anti-establishment views and redirect candidate support63 
by using messaging designed to reduce trust in the political system.64  IRA 
content also adopted specific political stances, mentioning Trump and 
Clinton by name.65  The ICA concluded—with high confidence—that 
Russia’s goals were to undermine the U.S. democratic process and harm 
Hillary Clinton’s electability and potential presidency.66  
The IRA’s campaigns did not stop with the 2016 election or even when 
the U.S. intelligence community caught them.  To the contrary, engagement 
rates increased and covered a broader range of public policy and national 
security issues, along with social issues relevant to younger voters.67  The ICA 
warned that Russia and other foreign adversaries are likely to expand on 
these tactics to meddle in future elections and further polarize American 
society.68  FBI Director Chris Wray declared in July 2018 that “malign 
influence operations” by Russia and others are actively underway.69  Russia’s 
defense minister has also announced plans to expand its information warfare 
capability.70   
 
 60 NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 8. 
 61 OXFORD REPORT, supra note 37, at 3.  
 62 Id. at 19.  
 63 NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 83 (noting that left-targeted content focused on 
identity and pride, and encouraged voting for candidates other than Clinton).  
 64 OXFORD REPORT, supra note 37, at 20 (describing messaging to LGBT and liberal voters as seeking 
to reduce trust in the political system).  
 65 NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 76 (stating that approximately 6% of tweets, 18% of 
Instagram posts, and 7% of Facebook posts mentioned the candidates by name). 
 66 ICA, supra note 30, at 1. 
 67 OXFORD REPORT, supra note 37, at 3.  
 68 Joseph Thai, The Right to Receive Foreign Speech, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 269, 273–74 (2018) (citing ICA, 
supra note 30, at 5).  
 69 Connor O’Brien, FBI Director: Russia ‘Continues to Engage in Malign Influence Operations’ Against U.S., 
POLITICO (July 18, 2018, 9:50 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/18/fbi-wray-
russia-meddling-732337.  
 70 See Vladimir Isachenkov, Russia Military Acknowledges New Branch: Info Warfare Troops, AP NEWS (Feb. 
22, 2017), https://apnews.com/8b7532462dd0495d9f756c9ae7d2ff3c/russian-military-continues-
massive-upgrade (discussing “information warfare troops,” Russia’s new branch of the military).  
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Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to assess his department’s 
capability to engage with social media and publicly available information in 
May 2016, which was too late to stop Russian interference in the presidential 
election.71  The precise impact of these disinformation campaigns on 
elections is hard to measure, which may have made some government actors 
reluctant to devote resources to stop them.  However, the campaigns have 
undoubtedly succeeded in sowing dissension in American society, creating 
protests over fake issues online.72  Regardless of whether they changed the 
outcome of any given election, the United States must stop its adversaries 
from weaponizing American freedoms to cause dissension and violence 
within its borders.   
Any legislation or regulatory oversight relating to social media will clash 
with U.S. doctrine on free speech.  The United States’ commitment to free 
speech and privacy creates an asymmetric disadvantage against Russia and 
other adversaries who routinely engage in censorship, manipulation, and 
suppression of ideas.73  The New Knowledge Report highlights that “[o]ur 
deeply-felt national scruples about misidentifying a fake account or 
inadvertently silencing someone, however briefly, create a welcoming 
environment for malign groups who masquerade as Americans or who game 
algorithms.”74  To combat Russian threats to the U.S. democratic process—
and to social order more generally—the United States must confront how its 
domestic law constrains its ability to fight information warfare.  Stronger 
rules and norms are also needed to prevent the use of social media and new 
information technologies to manipulate U.S. elections.75  
II.  HOW U.S. LAW TIES U.S. HANDS 
First Amendment freedoms create an environment ripe for Russia’s 
disinformation campaigns.  As Eric Posner explains, the “First Amendment 
 
 71 H.R. REP. NO. 114-537, at 91, 246–47 (2016) (acknowledging that the Department of Defense 
lacked sufficient capacity and directive to address information warfare and directing the 
Department to assess and address the issue). 
 72 See e.g., Claire Allbright, A Russian Facebook Page Organized A Protest in Texas. A Different Russian Page 
Launched the Counterprotest., TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/
2017/11/01/russian-facebook-page-organized-protest-texas-different-russian-page-l/.  
 73 Id.  
 74 NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 100.  
 75 Id. (noting that more investigation needs to be done to understand and address information warfare 
threats to U.S. elections).  
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protects propagandists whom U.S. authorities could reach, and national 
borders protect propagandists whom the First Amendment does not 
protect.”76  In short, the First Amendment gives the highest protection to 
political speech, which, under Supreme Court precedent, applies to many 
Russian disinformation efforts.  The First Amendment also protects 
falsehoods, and caselaw suggests this would include much Russian fake 
news.77  Counterspeech, the presumptive remedy to false speech, is limited 
in its utility.  The Supreme Court’s doctrine on incitement, one of the few 
areas of speech that is not protected by the First Amendment, likely does not 
extend to Russian disinformation campaigns in its current form.  Concerns 
with surveillance infringing on privacy and chilling speech also inhibit the 
U.S. Government’s ability to respond to Russian disinformation campaigns.  
Any legislation that would allow the United States to combat information 
warfare must overcome these hurdles. 
A.  The New Private Public Square 
Many of the Supreme Court’s seminal cases on freedoms of speech and 
the press were decided before the advent of the Internet, social media, and 
big data.  Therefore, the factual assumptions of those cases do not transplant 
perfectly onto today’s social media environment. When the Internet made it 
far easier to extend the reach of disinformation beyond a country’s borders, 
it fundamentally altered the scope of the First Amendment.  The law remains 
stagnant.  The Supreme Court has tried to graft the metaphor of the public 
square, the paradigmatic venue for the exchange of free speech and ideas, 
onto the Internet context.  However, the Supreme Court’s analysis suffers 
from several critical flaws, including the failure to distinguish social media 
from the Internet at large, the failure to distinguish social media from 
traditional media, and the limits of counterspeech.  
1.  Social Media Is Not the Internet, and Neither Is the Public Square 
Supreme Court jurisprudence lumps the Internet together with social 
media as part of the “new public square.”  The first Internet-related case 
resolved in the Supreme Court was Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, in 
 
 76 Eric Posner, Are Russian Trolls Protected by the First Amendment?, ERIC POSNER (Feb. 17, 2018), 
http://ericposner.com/are-russian-trolls-protected-by-the-first-amendment/.  
 77 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).  
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which the Court established that online speech does not receive a lesser 
degree of First Amendment protection than other speech.78  In Reno, the 
ACLU sued the U.S. Attorney General, claiming that two provisions of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”) violated the First 
Amendment.79  The provisions criminalized the “knowing transmission of 
obscene or indecent” messages to minors, and “knowing, sending, or 
displaying of patently offensive messages” to minors that contain “sexual or 
excretory activities or organs.”80  The Supreme Court held that “the blanket 
provisions were an impermissible infringement on free speech rights.”81  The 
provisions “were content-based restrictions because they regulated the 
subject matter and type of speech,” and therefore were subject to strict 
scrutiny.82  The Court found the content-based restrictions to be overbroad 
and vague, as “indecent” and “obscene” were not defined.83  Although Reno 
did not specifically involve social media websites, courts later relied on this 
case when extending First Amendment protection to social media.  
In the early 2010s, district courts extended Reno to find that the First 
Amendment protects a wall post84 and “liking” a political candidate’s 
 
 78 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment 
scrutiny that should be applied to [the Internet].”); see also Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263, 
272 (4th Cir. 2010) (recognizing the Internet standard presented in Reno).  
 79 Reno, 521 U.S. at 861.  
 80 Id. at 859–60.  The first provision, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), “prohibits the knowing transmission of 
obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age.” Id. at 859.  The second 
provision, 47 U.S.C. § 223(d), “prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive 
messages in a manner that is available to a person under 18 years of age.” Id.  
 81 Katherine A. Ferry, Comment, Reviewing the Impact of the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of “Social Media” 
As Applied to Off-Campus Student Speech, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 717, 743 (2018); see also Reno, 521 U.S. 
at 868 (noting that the CDA is a “content-based blanket restriction on speech”); Andrew H. 
Montroll, Note, Students’ Free Speech Rights in Public Schools: Content-Based Versus Public Forum Restrictions, 
13 VT. L. REV. 493, 500 (1989) (describing the Supreme Court’s traditionally strict approach to 
content-based speech restrictions). 
 82 See Blum et al., Tests to be Applied to Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulations, 16A AM. JUR. 2D 
Constitutional Law § 480 (2017) (describing the analysis concerning content-based restrictions).                
 83 Reno, 521 U.S. at 877–79.  
 84 See Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215(JLH), 2011 WL 5184283 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2011) 
(holding that a public employee’s Facebook post was protected under the First Amendment); 
Gresham v. City of Atlanta, No. 1:10-CV-1301-RWS, 2011 WL 4601020 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2011) 
adhered to on reconsideration, No. 1:10-CV-1301-RWS, 2012 WL 1600439 (N.D. Ga. May 7, 2012) and 
aff’d, 542 F. App’x 817 (11th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the plaintiff’s Facebook post was entitled 
to First Amendment protection). 
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Facebook page.85  In the 2017 case of Packingham v. North Carolina, the first 
Supreme Court case to address social media, the Court struck down a North 
Carolina statute that prohibited sex offenders from accessing social media 
sites.86  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, famously characterized the 
Internet as “the new public square.”87  Kennedy noted that 70% of American 
adults were then using at least one social media site, and Facebook’s 
membership—the particular site at issue—was three times the size of North 
America’s population.88  While the Court likened the Internet to the public 
square, the worldwide reach of the Internet has outgrown any physical public 
square in its role as a channel for expression.89  The Court explained that 
social media websites:  
can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private 
citizen to make his or her voice heard.  They allow a person with an Internet 
connection to ‘become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than 
it could from any soapbox.’  In sum, to foreclose access to social media 
altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise of 
First Amendment rights.90 
This reasoning underscores the role of social media as a public forum for 
speech.  
The Court recognized that legislatures could limit First Amendment 
protection for sex offenders using narrowly tailored statutes.  However, it 
found that the statute at issue, though content-neutral, burdened more 
speech than was necessary to advance the government’s interest in protecting 
vulnerable victims from dangerous predators.91  Thus, North Carolina did 
not meet its burden of showing that a sweeping law barring access to social 
media sites is necessary or legitimate to serve the stated purpose of keeping 
sex offenders away from vulnerable victims. 
 
 85 Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386, 394 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding that “liking” a Facebook page is 
speech protected by the First Amendment but remanding on other grounds). 
 86 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
 87 Id. at 1737 (describing the Internet as “the modern public square”). 
 88 Id. at 1735; see also Facebook, Company Info, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, https://newsroom.fb.com/
company-info/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (noting that there were “1.59 billion daily active users on 
Facebook on average for June 2019”); Jessica Guynn, Facebook Now Averages 8 Billion Daily Video Views, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 4, 2015, 8:10 PM), http://usat.ly/2huc6St (“Facebook says it now averages 8 
billion daily views from 500 million users.”).  
 89 Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (referring to the Internet as the “modern public square”).  
 90 Id. at 1737 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).  
 91 Id. at 1737–38.  
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Packingham thus clarifies that the same First Amendment standards that 
protect the actual public square also protect social media sites.  As discussed 
below, political speech has traditionally received the highest constitutional 
protections within the public square.  Presuming that foreign propaganda 
qualifies as protected political speech, foreign disinformation campaigns may 
then receive the highest level of First Amendment protections. 
2.  The Realities of the Public Square  
The realities of the old public square, however, are quite different from 
those of the “new” one.  The Internet may be a public zone of sorts because 
of the ability of any user to post and receive information on publicly available 
sites.  Nevertheless, social media serves as the battleground for information 
campaigns precisely because of attributes that distinguish it from the 
idealized public square of pre-Internet First Amendment jurisprudence.  
Moreover, courts have treated “the Internet” as a monolith in their decisions, 
lumping social media sites together with search engines and Internet 
retailers.  In the context of free speech and political debate, different types of 
Internet sites present distinct constitutional issues that are critical for 
combatting information warfare.92  
Two common types of Internet sites—search engines and social media—
present different legal issues related to the First Amendment and privacy.  
The way users interface with the Google search engine is entirely different 
from the way users interact with one another on social media.  Users of a 
search engine are presented with the product of search results.  A search 
engine company’s responsibility to its users is to provide the most relevant 
results, and to distinguish for its users those companies who have paid for 
their results to be advertised.  The data that users enter into a search engine 
is information for which they wish to search, not necessarily personal data 
about themselves, their family, or their relationships.93  Social media sites, by 
contrast, require more personal user interaction.  Users enter personal 
information on a profile and connect with friends or other contacts.  They 
communicate with each other through the site, post and share information, 
and comment on that information.  Most social media sites do not generate 
 
 92 The authors acknowledge that, in some contexts, it may be appropriate for the Court to treat social 
media and other Internet sites similarly.  However, we argue that social media presents some unique 
constitutional issues in the context of political speech and information warfare.  
 93 We recognize, however, that questions or topics searched can certainly be revealing of one’s 
personal circumstances and other information. 
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news items on their own, but they allow users to create and share content 
using the websites as platforms.  Social media companies may agree to keep 
users’ data private or publicly available on the Internet.  These companies 
profit from advertisers who target potential customers with user data.  Unlike 
search engines, social media companies do not only provide information; 
they provide users an experience and advertisers a platform to sell their 
products.  
Perhaps most importantly, private companies govern social media.  U.S. 
persons do not have the same negative rights against private companies as 
they do against the government.  Private companies exist for profit and have 
the right to accept money for advertising and post-boosting by paid 
companies without restrictions.  Social media companies do exercise a type 
of governance over the online communities that they have created.94  
Although not all social media sites have as intricate a communal structure as 
Facebook, they all have terms of service that amount to contracts of adhesion 
between the companies and their users.  However, social media users do not 
benefit from constitutional protections against their social media 
“government.”  Social media companies may engage in data mining that 
would likely constitute search, seizure, or surveillance and face regulation if 
done by the U.S. Government.  
While social media sites are important venues for discourse and 
expression, social media differs drastically from the public square.  Public 
squares are sites for human interaction.  Visitors to a public square can see 
who enters and exits, and be sure that they are real people.  Visitors can more 
easily filter out real news sources from fake news sources when interacting 
with real people.  They can see the human source of the news, can directly 
and instantaneously ask questions about the legitimacy of the source and 
content, and can better determine the veracity of the information given to 
them.  There is a limit to the amount of information that a person can receive 
in a public square in a short period.  Public squares do not usually have echo 
chambers that facilitate the repetition of false messages.  The capacity to 
enter a public square and speak in it rarely depends upon whether a State 
sponsors a speaker or whether one speaker can pay to promote posts more 
 
 94 See generally Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018) (describing the social media platform’s regulation of speech as 
“governance”). 
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than others.  Speech is not spoken or heard on social media the way it is in a 
public square, since a post may be seen and shared long after it is originally 
“spoken.”95  
Social media is particularly vulnerable to influence and disinformation 
campaigns in ways that the public square is not.  Social media was designed 
to open unfiltered, personalized channels of communication.  It does not 
possess the filters and vetting systems of traditional news media to process 
what is true and what is false.96  Thus, the platforms enable false information 
to spread widely and quickly.97  Social networks amplify the reach and 
effectiveness of sensational stories, including those from foreign speakers 
acting to influence U.S. political conversations.  Precise, targeted advertising 
capabilities magnify the effect of those wishing to spread disinformation on 
social media.98  In 2016, divisive propaganda campaigns delivering targeted 
messaging to Right, Left, and African-American communities were made 
more effective by the echo chambers inherent in social media.  Further, 
sharing functions and the wide breadth of the campaign improved the reach 
of disinformation to members of the targeted communities.  
Thus, social media is not a public square and should not be legally treated 
as such.  As Justice Kennedy recognized in Packingham, the Internet has 
increased the size of the public square far beyond what the builders of any 
physical public square ever conceived.  Yet the Supreme Court has failed to 
recognize the implications of that infinite expansion for the usefulness of this 
hallowed metaphor.  Social media is only one part of the Internet, and both 
social media and the Internet are distinct from the idealized public square 
assumed in free speech jurisprudence.  Distinguishing between the roles that 
the Internet and social media play as fora for political speech is critical to 
creating distinctly tailored constitutional laws and regulations to protect the 
 
 95 John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for the First Amendment: The Framework for an Internet Incitement 
Standard, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 425, 428 (2002) (noting that “the vast majority of Internet 
communications . . . are usually ‘heard’ well after they are ‘spoken’”).  As of November 2019, 
Cronan is the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ Criminal Division. 
 96 See Samantha Power, Opinion, Samantha Power: Why Foreign Propaganda Is More Dangerous Now, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/opinion/samantha-power-
propaganda-fake-news.html (discussing the risk of foreign influence online). 
 97 See David M. Howard, Can Democracy Withstand the Cyber Age: 1984 in the 21st Century, 69 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1355, 1371 (2018) (noting the prevalence of disinformation in the media and its impact on the 
role social media plays). 
 98 See Thai, supra note 68, at 307 (“[T]he voluntary clustering of politically likeminded individuals and 
the application of sophisticated ad targeting, can greatly amplify the reach . . . of a sensational story 
from a foreign speaker seeking to influence the domestic political marketplace.”).  
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integrity of the electoral process.  The metaphor of the “public square” may 
have been more apt for the Internet early in its history.  Today, social media 
places political discourse under private control and creates an environment 
ripe for exploitation.  
3. Virtual Media is not Traditional Media 
Scholars and courts frequently apply a First Amendment framework 
based on traditional media to the Internet and social media.  However, 
important distinctions might justify different treatment under First 
Amendment doctrine.  As discussed above, social media and the Internet are 
susceptible to disinformation campaigns in ways that traditional media are 
not.  
Scholar Alan Chen has identified three distinctive features of the Internet 
compared to other media:  broad and instantaneous amplification of 
information, relatively inexpensive cost, and elements of anonymity.99  When 
extending existing First Amendment doctrine to social media, courts might 
wish to distinguish it on these grounds.  The fact that the Internet is faster 
and cheaper at disseminating information is less likely to be a distinguishing 
factor; telecommunications have only gotten faster and less expensive over 
time, with little change to First Amendment jurisprudence as a result.  The 
features of anonymity that the Internet provides drastically change the 
speaker-audience relationship envisioned in prior First Amendment 
jurisprudence such that this criterion might be fertile ground for 
distinguishing the Internet.  The ability of a speaker to remain anonymous 
complicates the question of attribution for speech.  Previously, the audience 
who heard someone shouting “fire” in a crowded theater could look at the 
speaker and make some judgment as to her credibility to sound such an 
alarm.  On the Internet, a decent graphic designer or video editor can 
provide a veneer of credibility that would be more difficult for humans to 
match than in person.  Traditional media also involves an important layer of 
professional editorial review for content that is mostly absent on social media.  
To the extent that social media companies approve advertisements, they are 
 
 99 Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of National Security and Internet Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 379, 391 (2017).  
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not subject to the same degree of regulation as law requires for 
advertisements on broadcast media.100    
Unlike previous content distributors (e.g., book distributors) and 
traditional media, social media platforms do little, if anything, to curate the 
sources and content disseminated on their platforms.101  Professional rules of 
conduct and ethical norms bind traditional news outlets and journalists on 
media platforms.  These traditional outlets involve a layer of editorial 
oversight, often including fact-checking, before publishing a story.  Social 
media contains no such checks for professionalism, ethics, or veracity.  The 
social media user alone bears the burden to distinguish between fake and 
legitimate news.102  As discussed below, most consumers are not able to 
distinguish the sources and determine the legitimacy of the news. 
In some circumstances, the lines between online media and regular media 
blur.  Traditional media sites like the New York Times, for example, also have 
websites and interactive functions, and traditional First Amendment 
interpretations may still be adequate for these sites.  However, in the context 
of information warfare, the failure of courts and commentators to recognize 
distinctions between online and traditional media is problematic.  In this 
context, traditional media and online media function differently, and social 
media functions differently from much other Internet media—and vastly 
different from the public square.  Any effective laws to fight information 
warfare must account for these important distinctions.  Even more 
importantly, courts must interpret such laws based on appropriate, 
empirically-based assumptions. 
 
4.  The Limits of Counterspeech 
 
Much of U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence is based on the doctrine 
of counterspeech.  The counterspeech doctrine proposes that more true 
 
 100 For example, Federal Election Commission rules regarding advertising and disclosure that apply to 
traditional media do not apply to social media. See, e.g., Advertising and Disclaimers, FED. ELECTION 
COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/making-disbursements/
advertising/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). The Honest Ads Act aimed to close some of these loopholes 
but was not passed by Congress. See Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017). 
 101 Napoli, supra note 1, at 85. 
 102 See id. (noting that the “relatively limited ability” of social media platforms “to distinguish between 
fake and legitimate news stories/sources” has been transferred to the media consumer). 
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speech will drown out false speech in the Millian marketplace of ideas:  a free 
and competitive speech environment with limited government 
interference.103  The doctrine was most famously articulated in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California in 1927.104  In 
concurrence, Brandeis wrote, “If there be time to expose through discussion 
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the 
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”105  For Brandeis, 
the solution to false speech is to counter it with more speech.  True and false 
speech will compete in the marketplace of ideas until the truth prevails.106 
Accordingly, counterspeech is often proposed as a solution to respond to 
falsity in political campaign communications.107  Yet the counterspeech 
doctrine rests on several major assumptions that may not be true in any 
context and are especially mistaken in the social media context.  First, it 
assumes that individuals can distinguish between true and false 
information.108  Second, it assumes participants value true information more 
than false information.109  Scientific studies cast doubt on both of these 
assumptions.110  These studies show that people usually accept information 
uncritically.  They do not usually question the information’s credibility unless 
it challenges their existing assumptions, or they have incentives to do so.  
 
 103 See Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of ldeas, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1160, 1167 
(2015) (observing that Brandeis’ concurring opinion in Whitney v. California is a “canonical 
formulation” of the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade 
in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be 
carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution.”). 
 104 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 105 Id. 
 106 See Alexandra Andorfer, Note, Spreading like Wildfire: Solutions for Abating the Fake News Problem on Social 
Media via Technology Controls and Government Regulation, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1409, 1422 (2018) (noting 
Justice Holmes’s idea that “true speech should compete with falsehoods in the ‘marketplace of ideas’ 
until the truth eventually wins”).  
 107 See Rickert v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 832 (Wash. 2007) (“[T]he best remedy for 
false or unpleasant speech is more speech, not less speech.”).  
 108 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 799, 801 (2010) (noting that counterspeech assumes that audiences can “rationally assess[] 
the truth, quality, and credibility” of speech).  
 109 Napoli, supra note 1, at 61 (citation omitted).  
 110 See BENKLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 5–6 (“This flurry of [research] exhibited a broad sense that 
as a public we have lost our capacity to agree on shared modes of validation as to what is going on 
and what is just plain whacky.”); Lazer et al., supra note 27, at 1095 (discussing studies that show 
people are “more likely to accept familiar information as true”). 
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Individuals are often inclined to align their beliefs with those in their 
communities, making echo chambers more powerful.111  According to a team 
of law professors and social scientists examining fake news, “[r]esearch also 
further demonstrates that people prefer information that confirms their 
preexisting attitudes (selective exposure), view information consistent with 
their preexisting beliefs as more persuasive than dissonant information 
(confirmation bias), and are inclined to accept information that pleases them 
(desirability bias).”112  Other scholars argue that retractions and refutations 
are rarely effective, especially as time passes.113  People may be inclined to 
accept false information over accurate facts, especially if disinformation is 
repeated.114  Thus, social media users may not be able to distinguish true 
from false information.  More surprisingly, depending on their preferences, 
they may not want to do so. 
Third, the doctrine assumes that the speech environment will allow users 
to distinguish between true and false information.115  This assumption is 
especially troubling in the social media environment.  False statements like 
propaganda affect consumers’ ability to distinguish real from fake news 
because false statements disguise the source.  Propaganda operations may be 
anonymous or may masquerade as legitimate news outlets.116  Adding to the 
confusion over the veracity of information, legitimate and illegitimate news 
outlets often exist in the same social media feeds.117  As Professor Lyrissa 
Lidsky notes, the concept of a rational audience that can process the news 
and assess the credibility and truth is a hallowed idea in First Amendment 
theory but not an empirical reality.118 
Given what we now know about human psychology, counterspeech may 
not be sufficient to overcome false news.  It might even be counterproductive 
in some circumstances.  Repeating false information, even in the context of 
 
 111 Lazer et al., supra note 27, at 1095.  
 112 Id.   
 113 Paul & Matthews, supra note 22, at 9. 
 114 Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating “Fake News” and Other Online Advertising, 91 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1269 (2018).  
 115 Napoli, supra note 1, at 61. 
 116 Id. at 83.  
 117 Id. 
 118 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 147, 155 (2011) 
(“First Amendment doctrines dealing with incendiary speech rest largely on the assumption that 
audiences will behave rationally and not leap to violence when confronted with offensive or 
inflammatory speech.”).  
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counterspeech, may perversely increase the likelihood that people will believe 
it.  Empirical testing of claim repetition in fact-checking has been 
inconclusive thus far.119  
The fourth potentially flawed assumption of the Supreme Court’s 
counterspeech doctrine is that there is no such thing as too much speech.  
Neither Mill nor Brandeis could have foreseen the overwhelming amount of 
speech freely available on the Internet and in today’s marketplace of ideas.120  
Structural and economic changes in this era of news media and information 
undermine the view that truth will prevail over falsity.121  The hyper-
sensationalistic attributes, wide dissemination, and ease of production of fake 
news could theoretically shrink the market for real journalism.122  The high-
volume approach of Russian information warfare can drown out competing 
messages.  Justice Brandeis’s formulation of counterspeech assumes sufficient 
time is available to separate truth from falsehood.  In the face of 
overwhelming amounts of both, separation may not be possible. 
Fifth, the doctrine assumes that people exposed to false information are 
more likely than not to be exposed to corresponding true information.123  The 
doctrine did not foresee the social media bubbles that most users inhabit.  
Counterspeech may never reach those most affected due to highly polarized 
social media echo chambers.124  The flawed assumptions underlying the 
doctrine of counterspeech sharply limit its effectiveness in the social media 
environment.  
Thus, past Supreme Court doctrine on the public square and 
counterspeech may be incompatible with the context of the Internet and 
social media.  More research is required to discover the conditions under 
 
 119 Lazer et al., supra note 27, at 1095. 
 120 See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech, the Search for Truth and the Problem of Collective Knowledge, 70 SMU L. 
REV. 231, 250 (2017) (“[T]he entire analysis here takes place entirely within a set of search for 
truth/marketplace of ideas justifications for freedom of speech, a set of justifications that has not 
fared well when subject to close analytical and empirical scrutiny . . . .”).  See generally Napoli, supra 
note 1, at 61 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 259 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“[G]iven the premises of democracy, there is no such thing as too much 
speech.”). 
 121 Napoli, supra note 1, at 59.  
 122 Andorfer, supra note 106, at 1423–24.   
 123 See Vincent Blasi, Reading Holmes through the Lens of Schauer: The Abrams Dissent, 72 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1343, 1357 (1997) (“[T]he efficacy of refutation still turns on whether the counter-message 
comes to the attention of all persons who were swayed by the original idea.”).  
 124 Thai, supra note 68, at 310.  
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which certain counterspeech methods might work.  Counterspeech remains 
the preferred remedy to false speech and disinformation under current First 
Amendment doctrine.  However, its effectiveness as a remedy in the social 
media context is doubtful.  
B.  Political Speech and Protections for Falsehoods 
Compounding the challenges of information warfare is that the First 
Amendment protects “deliberate, nonlibelous falsehoods.”125  In recent 
years, the Supreme Court has expanded and clarified these protections.  In 
the 2012 case of United States v. Alvarez, the Court struck down the Stolen 
Valor Act, a federal statute that criminalized false claims that one had 
received military medals.126  Justice Kennedy, writing for a plurality, asserted 
that First Amendment cases require the strictest scrutiny, regardless of 
whether the content of speech is true or false.  Few categories of speech, such 
as obscenity, incitement to imminent lawless action, defamation, fighting 
words, speech integral to criminal conduct, true threats, and child 
pornography, are exempt from this ban on content-based regulation.  Even 
then, false speech may be constitutionally protected, as in defamation cases.  
Under Alvarez, false statements can only be regulated if the speaker intended 
to cause “legally cognizable harm” and a direct causal link exists between the 
“restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”127  Justice Breyer, 
joined by Justice Kagan in concurrence, said that prohibitions of false speech 
should receive only intermediate scrutiny.  Despite the split holding, Alvarez 
represents the Court’s most robust protections for false speech. 
Following Alvarez, in 2016, the Sixth Circuit struck down a statute that 
criminalized false statements made about political candidates as 
unconstitutional suppression of speech and noted potential corresponding 
chilling effects.128  Likewise, in 2010, the Ninth Circuit held that “[t]he right 
to speak and write whatever one chooses—including, to some degree, 
worthless, offensive, and demonstrable untruths—without cowering in fear 
of a powerful government is, in our view, an essential component of the 
protection afforded by the First Amendment.”129  This line of precedent 
 
 125 Andorfer, supra note 106, at 1428 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012)).  
 126 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012). 
 127 Id. at 719, 725. 
 128 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 129 United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).  
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would support the protection of fake news in the electoral context, especially 
given potential chilling effects.  
Supreme Court jurisprudence would not likely support legislation that 
blocked false or misleading foreign speech merely on social value grounds.  
For example, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the Court struck 
down a state ban on the sale of violent video games to minors because speech, 
regardless of cultural or intellectual worth, is protected by First Amendment 
standards.130  And, in United States v. Stevens, the Court invalidated a federal 
ban targeting fetishistic depictions of animal cruelty because “an ad hoc 
balancing of relative social costs and benefits” encouraging government 
regulation infringes on First Amendment values.131 
Stevens, in particular, suggests that the Court must conclude that the 
government cannot regulate speech on the basis that it is distasteful or has 
little social value.  Instead, the speech must generate enough adverse effects 
to justify a censoring of speech.  If the government sought to bar speech 
merely because it had less social value, it would limit the marketplace of 
ideas.  Even if speech has little social value, the First Amendment demands 
that people can express and communicate their opinions to others, however 
mistaken, disagreeable, or offensive others may find them.  Given this 
demand, it is unlikely that the government could block false or misleading 
foreign speech merely on social value grounds. 
Thus, under First Amendment jurisprudence, government restrictions on 
foreign speech, even speech that promotes falsehoods, are likely 
unconstitutional.132  A plurality of the Court has held that the First 
Amendment protects fake news and that the government cannot restrict 
speech of questionable social value. 133  Two other factors buttress this point.  
First, because of the Internet’s globalizing function, domestic listeners now 
have more access to foreign speech than ever.134  Second, First Amendment 
 
 130 564 U.S. 786, 786, 805 (2011).  
 131 559 U.S. 460, 461, 482 (2010).  
 132 See Thai, supra note 68, at 305 (noting that Supreme Court decisions “likely preclude the 
government from barring the entry of political speech from abroad . . . or that the speech is valueless 
or false . . . because the First Amendment demands an open marketplace of ideas for domestic 
listeners.”).  
 133 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 710 (2012). 
 134 See Thai, supra note 68, at 274 (“[T]he digitization and globalization of speech on the internet has 
made physical border restrictions largely irrelevant.”).  
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doctrine emphasizes the listener’s robust right to receive speech.135  While 
foreign speakers cannot claim First Amendment protection,136 prohibiting 
U.S. persons from accessing foreign speech violates the right to receive 
information and ideas.137  As long as listeners—even if they are unwilling 
listeners—have the individual power to block the receipt of speech, the 
government cannot bar speech distribution on a wholesale basis as a method 
to protect listeners.138  A listener’s right to receive information does not 
depend on the speaker’s nationality or from where the speech geographically 
originated.139 
C.  The Incitement Standard is Limited in the Internet Context 
Some Russian disinformation tactics resemble fact patterns in incitement 
cases.140  For example, an IRA-created page for a fake organization, “Heart 
of Texas,” promoted a public protest of the Islamic Da’wah Center in 
Houston, specifically against the Center’s opening of a new library.  One 
comment urged, “Need to blow this place up.  We don’t need this [expletive] 
in Texas.”  Another IRA-created page promoted a “Houston Counter 
Against Hate.”  The pages planned a protest and counter-protest for the 
same day.  The protesters on both sides fought verbally, but not physically.  
However, First Amendment jurisprudence on incitement presents a high 
bar to censoring or criminalizing such speech.  In Brandenburg v. Ohio,141 the 
seminal Supreme Court case on the topic, the Court defined criteria for 
censoring speech.  The Court held that a state may not prohibit any advocacy 
of the use of force or the violation of a law unless it is “directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and [it] is likely to incite or produce such 
 
 135 Id. (discussing the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence). 
 136 Id. at 276 (“[T]he Court has neither held nor assumed that foreign speakers abroad enjoy any First 
Amendment protection.”).  
 137 Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1169, 1178 (2016) (noting that the marketplace of ideas theory “emphasizes the production 
of information regardless of source”). 
 138 Thai, supra note 68, at 282.  
 139 Id.  
 140 Carolyn Y. Forrest, Russia’s Disinformation Campaign: The New Cold War, 33 COMMC’NS. LAW. 2, 
Winter 2018, at 3 (discussing how the public was manipulated by Russian-linked content) (2018); 
see also BENKLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 263 (noting the disinformation campaign has orchestrated 
real-world rallies).  
 141 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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action.”142  The Brandenburg standard is only satisfied if someone explicitly 
urges serious, unlawful, and imminent conduct that is public and 
ideological.143  Courts must consider the speech in context.  The Court has 
applied Brandenburg only twice since 1969 and has continued to uphold a 
broad right to free speech.144   
The imminence requirement of Brandenburg is difficult to apply to 
incitement on the Internet for three reasons.  First, as John Cronan notes, 
words in the cyber-world are often “‘heard’ well after they are ‘spoken,’” and 
are rarely heard by all readers simultaneously.”145  A provocative post would 
survive the Brandenburg standard because a disqualifying delay would likely 
occur between the time a reader or readers read the post and any unlawful 
action.  Second, the speaker-audience relationship on the Internet is different 
than that imagined in Brandenburg.  Internet posts are rarely designed for 
specific individuals and can easily spread across large and undefined 
audiences.146  Third, it can be difficult to assess the intent standard behind 
an Internet post.147  Recently, in United States v. Carmichael, a federal district 
court noted that, under Reno, “hostile speech disseminated to a broad 
audience should be treated as less threatening than speech directed to a 
specific person.”148  This suggests that incitement on the Internet may present 
less concern than what is said in person.  Thus, the Brandenburg standard likely 
precludes the government from barring political speech from foreigners, 
even if it advocates lawless action, because of the imminence standard.  
Some scholars have proposed modifying the incitement standard to 
encompass disinformation campaigns.  John Cronan suggests a new 
incitement standard for the Internet involving four primary factors:  “(1) 
 
 142 Id. at 447. 
 143 Clarified in Hess v. Indiana, “imminent” means that the speech must direct the action to happen 
right then. 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (reversing the conviction of an antiwar demonstrator on the 
understanding that his statement did not advocate imminent or violent action).  See also NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 929 (1982) (holding that when appeals to a crowd are 
protected speech when they do not incite lawless action).  
 144 Hess, 414 U.S. at 108; Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 927.  
 145 Cronan, supra note 95, at 428; see also Eugene Volokh, The Freedom of Speech and Bad Purposes, 63 
UCLA L. REV. 1366, 1383 (2016) (discussing the Brandenburg opinion and its application to speech 
protection). 
 146 Cronan, supra note 95, at 426.  
 147 Id. at 443. 
 148 Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Extremist Speech and the Internet: The Continuing Importance of 
Brandenburg, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 369 (2010).  
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imminence from the perspective of the listener; (2) content of the message; 
(3) likely audience; and (4) [the] nature of the issue involved.”149  However, 
such a standard would likely raise First Amendment concerns.  First, the 
Brandenberg standard considers imminence based on the intent of the speaker 
and the likelihood that the speech would cause imminent, unlawful action.  
Prior caselaw suggests that the Supreme Court would be unlikely to drop the 
requirement of the speaker’s intent.  Second, due to the unforeseeable reach 
of Internet postings, the audience that receives a post that imminently incites 
unlawful action may be different than that which the speaker initially 
intended. 
Moreover, as Chen notes, modifying Brandenburg may be undesirable 
because of the rapidly-changing contexts of the Internet and national 
security.150  Courts often show more deference to the State, even in the 
context of restrictions on civil liberties, during times of war or national 
security crises.151  The current era of constant information warfare, plus the 
proximity in time of Russia’s intervention in the 2016 elections, might lead 
to restrictions on free speech that would be undesirable in the long term.  
Thus, modification of the incitement standard in this manner is unlikely to 
be a good option for combatting disinformation. 
Some literature suggests modifying the imminence requirement by 
attempting to show a “direct” link between online speech and the acts in 
question as well as considering the target audience and instructions given.152  
However, Michael Sherman argues that this is not an effective solution 
because it “would likely be limited to a relatively small number of situations 
in which a target could be pinpointed with some degree of specificity from 
the speech in question.”153  Changing the Brandenburg standard would not 
solve the jurisdictional and technological hurdles independent of First 
 
 149 Cronan, supra note 95, at 455.  
 150 Chen, supra note 99, at 380 (suggesting that “it is premature to reconstruct the Brandenburg test to 
address perceived changes in our global environment”).  
 151 Id. at 386.  
 152 See Lidsky, supra note 118, at 161–62 (“[A] satisfactory replacement for imminence in cyber-
incitement cases would focus on ensuring that the causal linkage between the speech and the harm 
was a direct one . . . .”); see also Russell L. Weaver, Brandenburg and Incitement in a Digital Era, 80 
MISS. L. J. 1263, 1287 (2011) (noting that the Brandenburg approach was developed at a time before 
the Internet). 
 153 Michael J. Sherman, Brandenburg v. Twitter, 28 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 127, 138–39 
(2018). 
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Amendment doctrinal concerns.154  When considering the slippery-slope 
problem, changing this standard seems even more problematic.  Moreover, 
online platforms like Facebook receive criticism for applying their current 
policies unfairly by favoring some groups over others.155  As Sherman 
contends, while Facebook or Twitter “censorship” is vastly different from 
government censorship, there is a societal cost to “barring people from 
forums that are increasingly important to the exchange of ideas.”156 
 D.  Surveillance, Privacy, and the Chilling Effect 
Restrictions on U.S. Government surveillance of U.S. persons also place 
the United States at an asymmetric disadvantage in fighting information 
warfare.  Should the United States seek to regulate social media to prevent 
disinformation, it will need to surveil social media and other, similar 
platforms to discover the disinformation.  However, government 
observation, monitoring, or censorship of U.S. persons threatens freedom of 
speech.157  Oversight may result in a chilling effect on social media posts, 
which would raise fears of censorship in the new public square.158  Fear of 
impingement on free speech, however, hampers the United States’ ability to 
combat Russian influence campaigns. 
1.  2018 Executive Order on Election Interference 
In light of mounting evidence of Russian interference on the 2016 
elections, President Trump issued an Executive Order on Election 
Interference in 2018.159  However, this Order does not address the 
patchwork of U.S. surveillance laws that have prevented the intelligence 
 
 154 Id. at 162. 
 155 Id. at 163. 
 156 Id. at 164; see also Mark MacCarthy & Washington Bytes, What Should Policymakers Do to Encourage 
Better Platform Content Moderation?, FORBES  (May 14, 2019, 3:57 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/washingtonbytes/2019/05/14/what-should-policymakers-do-to-encourage-better-platform-
content-moderation/#14de817e1ee4 (“[D]eputizing platforms to remove legal material is a more 
general rule of law problem . . . .”).  
 157 Howard, supra note 97, at 1367; see also BENKLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 386 (noting that there 
will likely be a substantial surveillance cost if there is “national security identification of foreign 
propaganda campaigns”).  
 158 Howard, supra note 97, at 1368. 
 159 Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election, Exec. 
Order No. 13,848, 83 Fed. Reg. 179 (Sept. 12, 2018). 
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community from preventing threats to the electoral process.  The Order 
allows the intelligence community (“IC”) to respond after election 
interference occurs, but not before.  The Order provides that the Director of 
National Intelligence (“DNI”) has forty-five days after the conclusion of a 
federal election to determine whether a foreign government or agent has 
“acted with the intent or purpose of interfering in that election.”160  The DNI 
will assess the nature of the interference, the methods of interference, the 
persons involved, and the foreign government(s) “that authorized, directed, 
sponsored, or supported it.”161  After receiving DNI’s assessment, the 
Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security will provide the 
President and Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury with a report 
evaluating the extent to which the interference affected the security and 
integrity of the (1) election infrastructure162 and results and (2) political 
organizations, campaigns, or candidates, if they were targeted.163  
While the Order mentions that any actions by the intelligence 
community must respect First Amendment principles, it provides little 
guidance as to how the intelligence community can simultaneously collect 
intelligence relating to foreign interference in U.S. elections.  Without 
addressing laws that restrict national security actors from conducting 
necessary surveillance to protect First Amendment freedoms, this executive 
order will do little to keep Russia and other foreign actors from influencing 
U.S. elections. 
2.  The Privacy Act 
The Privacy Act of 1974 presents a formidable hurdle to combatting 
information warfare.  The Act was passed following Watergate, at the height 
 
 160 Id. § 1(a).  The DNI will make this determination in consultation with appropriate agencies. 
 161 Id.  
 162 The Order defines “election infrastructure” as “information and communications technology and 
systems used by or on behalf of the Federal Government or a State or local government in managing 
the election process, including voter registration databases, voting machines, voting tabulation 
equipment, and equipment for the secure transmission of election results.” Id. § 8(d).  For discussion 
on how states and the Federal Government can improve the integrity of their election 
infrastructure, see the Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on Russian Active Measures 
Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election,  S. REP. NO. 116-XX, at 54–61 (2019) 
(providing seven recommendations for improving cybersecurity in election infrastructure).  
 163 Exec. Order No. 13,848, supra note 159, § 1(b)(ii).  The report will be generated in consultation with 
appropriate agencies and state and local officials. Id. § 1(b). 
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of public concern over abuse of government surveillance.164  It regulates the 
government’s collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personally 
identifiable information about individuals contained in federal agency record 
systems.165  The Act seeks to protect individual privacy by preventing the 
unnecessary release or exposure of individual data.  
The Privacy Act requires that the public can identify general national 
databases or “systems of records,” which contain individually identifying 
information.166  Individuals whose data is stored in these databases have the 
right to access, correct, or amend the information within it.  The rules and 
regulations within the Privacy Act change depending on what type of agency 
is involved, the content of data, and how the data would be used.167  The Act 
covers only databases from which an individual’s data is retrievable using a 
personal identifier, such as a name or Social Security number.168  Any 
information collected must be “relevant and necessary to accomplish a 
[required] purpose of the agency.”169  Furthermore, when an agency 
establishes or revises the “existence or character” of a database, it must 
publish a notice in the Federal Register describing the records and how the 
government may use them.170  
 
 164 William Funk, Electronic Surveillance of Terrorism: The Intelligence/Law Enforcement Dilemma—A History, 
11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1099, 1110 (2007) (recounting the “various abuses by intelligence 
agencies, including NSA surveillance of Americans and drug traffickers, U.S. Army military 
intelligence surveillance of domestic groups, FBI covert operations against alleged subversive 
groups, CIA opening of domestic mail sent to or received from abroad, and electronic surveillance 
of political ‘enemies’”). 
 165 See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (stating its purpose is “to 
amend title 5, United States Code, by adding a section 552a to safeguard individual privacy from 
the misuse of federal records, to provide that individuals be granted access to records concerning 
them which are maintained by federal agencies . . . .”). 
 166 Statutory confidentiality guarantees prevent law enforcement agencies from accessing some 
databases, like Census Bureau databases. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (2017); U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, The “72-Year Rule,” U.S. CENSUS BUREAU  (last visited Oct. 20, 
2019), https://www.census.gov/history/www/genealogy/decennial_census_records/the_72_yea
r_rule_1.html (“The U.S. government will not release personally identifiable information about an 
individual to any other individual or agency until 72 years after it was collected for the decennial 
census.”).  The Privacy Act does not apply to this and other databases covered by specific 
confidentiality laws.   
 167 For instance, the Census Bureau is allowed to use personal records for statistical purposes. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(k)(4) (2017).  
 168 Id. § 552a(a)(5) (defining a “system of records” as a “group of any records under the control of any 
agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying 
number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual”). 
 169 Id. § 552a(e)(1).  
 170 Records, according to the Privacy Act, are: 
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When requesting data, federal agencies must clarify the authority under 
which the agency can solicit the information, and whether disclosing that 
information to the requesting agency is mandatory or voluntary.171  This 
requirement serves as an additional check to ensure that information in the 
database is not freely accessed or accessed without cause by agencies.  
Agencies can access or acquire the information gathered and “donated” to 
the database only on a need-to-know basis.  
The only category of sensitive data identified by the Privacy Act is 
personal data related to the exercise of First Amendment rights.  Under 
section 552a(e)(7) of the Privacy Act, the government cannot maintain 
records of a U.S. person’s First Amendment activities.  In other words, the 
Privacy Act prevents a government agency from keeping a file about how 
someone exercises their right to free speech.  The Act generally prohibits 
disclosure of any stored information—not just First Amendment 
information—without the written consent of the subject individual.  
However, protection for the data related to First Amendment activities 
does not apply to “authorized law enforcement activit[ies]” and some CIA 
activities.172  Law enforcement agencies like the FBI do not have a duty to 
disclose such collections.  An agency may not have to obtain written 
permission if the disclosure is subject to one of twelve statutory exceptions.  
Notably, law enforcement agencies, or components thereof, that primarily 
perform criminal law enforcement duties need not make disclosures.  The 
CIA may also exempt by rule any system of records it maintains, as explicitly 
provided for in 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(1).173  
 
[A]ny item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained 
by an agency, including, but not limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical 
history, and criminal or employment history and that contains his name, or the identifying 
number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger 
or voice print or a photograph. 
Id. § 552a(a)(4).  
 171 Id. § 552a(e)(3)(A). 
 172 Id. § 552a(e)(7); see also LEVINSON-WALDMAN, infra note 176, at 12 (discussing the misuses of the 
NSA’s broad surveillance authority). 
 173 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(1) (2017) (authorizing the CIA Director to promulgate rules exempting 
documents from the access provisions of the Act); see, e.g., Mobley v. CIA, 924 F. Supp. 2d 24, 55–
56 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding records necessarily exempt from the disclosure provisions of the Privacy 
Act because they concern intelligence methods); see also 32 C.F.R. § 1901.62(d) (2019) (providing 
that  individuals cannot access portions of the systems of records the CIA maintains that consist of 
or would reveal “intelligence sources or methods” and “documents or information provided by 
foreign, federal, state, or other public agencies”).  
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The Act’s purpose is to guarantee better protection of U.S. persons’ 
privacy by limiting the circumstances in which their information is retained 
and shared.174  Private litigation is the primary mechanism for legal oversight 
under the Privacy Act,175 and government officials may be subject to criminal 
prosecution for certain violations of it.176  However, the Act does not apply 
to data collected about persons outside the United States, nor does it protect 
the privacy of records that are maintained by the private sector or local or 
state governments.  
The Privacy Act has been attacked from all sides.  The DOJ has criticized 
the Act’s imprecise language, limited legislative history, and outdated 
guidelines.177  Some scholars and research organizations, like the Brennan 
Center for Justice, argue that the Act’s exceptions for national security and 
law enforcement undermine its goals of protecting privacy.  Rather than 
serving as a substantial check on government power to collect records, the 
Act functions as a “box-checking exercise.”178  Beyond the exceptions, gaps 
in the Privacy Act itself do not account for contingencies and potential threats 
to privacy.  For example, the Act has no third-party privacy exemption to 
prevent the disclosure of information about the third party in another’s file.179  
If Person A agreed to disclose information, the requesting agency could still 
use the data of Person B that exists in Person A’s file. 
Most importantly for this Article’s broader considerations, the law 
enforcement and nationality exemptions allow agencies to exempt 
 
 174 See LEVINSON-WALDMAN, infra note 176, at 49 n.413 (citing S. REP. NO. 99-1183, at 6916–18, 
6920 (1974)). 
 175 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (2017). 
 176 Id. § 552a(i); see also RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, WHAT THE 
GOVERNMENT DOES WITH AMERICANS’ DATA 12 (2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/publications/Data%20Retention%20-%20FINAL.pdf (noting the misuses of 
the NSA’s surveillance authority). 
 177 Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/opcl/
introduction (last updated July 27, 2015). 
 178 LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 176, at 49; see also Julia Angwin, U.S. Terrorism Agency to Tap a Vast 
Database of Citizens, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 13, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324478304578171623040640006 (quoting an observation by a Privacy Act 
consultant to government agencies: “All you have to do is publish a notice in the Federal Register 
and you can do whatever you want.”). 
 179 Evan M. Stone, The Invasion of Privacy Act: The Disclosure of My Information in Your Government File, 19 
WIDENER L. REV. 345, 348 (2013) (discussing the dilemma that is faced when a person requests 
access to something under the Privacy Act, but the file also contains information about another 
person).  
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“databases from the provisions requiring transparency and an opportunity 
to challenge the accuracy of personal information,”180 without detailed 
justification.  The meaning of this provision is not entirely clear, but it seems 
to create a loophole for agencies that act in national security or law 
enforcement capacities to subvert the Act’s protections on personal privacy 
and liberty, opening the door to a chilling effect on speech.  
The knowledge that the government might be collecting one’s Facebook 
posts could deter such posts being shared, thereby chilling free speech.  The 
concern is not baseless.  The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
recently published notice of an update to its current system of record, which 
is regulated by the Privacy Act.  This update, closed for comment on October 
18, 2017, allows DHS to consider whether the social media presence of 
persons seeking to gain entry to the United States justifies refusal of a visa.  
The update also involves DHS storing social media data of immigrants with 
green cards, naturalized citizens, and permanent residents.181  Another 
update allows DHS to source any information that is publicly available on 
the Internet on the record.182  Under this update, DHS considers social 
media handles, aliases, search results, and associated information.  
Immigrants are not U.S. persons until they obtain green cards or citizenship, 
so DHS may legally collect data related to their First Amendment activity.  
However, these updates affect U.S. citizens who communicate with 
immigrants, who may self-censor out of fear that the government could use 
the information they convey with those overseas against them.  Although the 
Privacy Act explicitly protects citizens and permanent residents, immigrants’ 
social media data may include information about protected persons.  In other 
words, U.S. citizens who interact with foreign visa applicants will have their 
data collected as third parties.  
 
 180 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (2017); LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 176, at 51. 
 181 It is unclear whether social media information collected during one’s immigration process can 
be used or shared after one is naturalized.  See Aleksander “Sasha” Danielyan, EFF Urges DHS to 
Abandon Social Media Surveillance and Automated “Extreme Vetting” of Immigrants, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/11/eff-urges-dhs-abandon-social-
media-surveillance-and-automated-extreme-vetting (explaining that information publicly available 
on the internet can be used by DHS for immigration enforcement purposes). 
 182 Notice of Modified Privacy Act System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,556 (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DHS-2017-0038-0001 (providing notice that DHS is 
updating their Privacy Act System of Records).  
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Further, the Privacy Act does not regulate actions committed in the 
course of an FBI investigation, nor how data is documented in the 
investigation if the data is pertinent to authorized law enforcement activity.  
Requiring a blanket prohibition on surveillance and recording until “the 
agency was investigating a specific offense or a specific person”183 would 
severely undermine agency activities.  Therefore, as long as the law 
enforcement agency prepares documents for a law enforcement purpose, it 
will not violate the Privacy Act even if the agency references First 
Amendment activity.  
Courts in Privacy Act cases have found that national security concerns 
generally prevail over concerns about the potential of the government’s 
actions to chill speech—advertently or inadvertently—where collecting the 
information is “pertinent to and within the scope of a currently ongoing 
authorized law enforcement activity.”184  However, courts have upheld 
claims regarding the expungement of records that do not meet this standard. 
The Ninth Circuit case of Garris v. Federal Bureau of Investigation clarifies 
this standard.185    
In Garris, the FBI had collected records and created memoranda 
regarding the plaintiff’s Internet and social media activities.186  The plaintiff 
argued that, under the Privacy Act, the FBI’s collection of his First 
Amendment data was illegal, and that the Bureau’s maintenance of these 
records in perpetuity was illegal because the records were not relevant to an 
active investigation.187  The district court previously granted summary 
judgment for the FBI.188   
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit drew a distinction between the 
maintenance of First Amendment data and the  “incidental” collection of 
 
 183 MacPherson v. IRS, 803 F.2d 479, 484 (9th Cir. 1986).  
 184 Garris v. FBI, 937 F.3d 1284, 1294 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added);  see, e.g., MacPherson, 803 F.2d 
at 484–85 (considering “the factors for and against the maintenance of such records of First 
Amendment activities on an individual, case-by-case basis” and holding the IRS and DOJ’s 
maintenance of the appellant’s protest speeches fell under the law enforcement exception because 
of their public nature); see also Bassiouni v. FBI, 436 F.3d 712, 718–19, 725 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding 
that the FBI did not violate the Privacy Act); Afifi v. Lynch, 101 F. Supp. 3d 90, 107 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(granting summary judgment because the records at issue complied with the Privacy Act).   
 185 Garris, 937 F.3d at 1300; Raimondo v. FBI, No. 13-cv-02295-JSC, 2016 WL 2642038, at *1–3 
(N.D. Cal. May 10, 2016), rev’d sub nom. Garris v. FBI, 937 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 186 Garris, 937 F.3d at 1299; Raimondo, 2016 WL 2642038 at *11–16. 
 187 Garris, 937 F.3d at 1288. 
 188 Id.; Raimondo, 2016 WL 2642038 at *16. 
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First Amendment data pursuant to an authorized law enforcement 
activity.189  Regarding the maintenance of data, the court held that “because 
the investigations underlying the Memos have concluded, the FBI’s 
maintenance of the Memos is not pertinent to an authorized ongoing law 
enforcement activity and therefore violates the [Privacy] Act.”190  To meet 
its burden to show that records are pertinent to an authorized ongoing or 
future law enforcement activity, an agency must “articulate a sufficient law 
enforcement activity to which the maintenance of the record is pertinent,”191  
that is, presents a basis as to why the agency needs to continue to maintain it 
that is more than “speculative relevance.”192  Therefore, even where the 
original investigation leading to the collection of the records ends, an agency 
can still retain the record if it is “pertinent to an authorized law enforcement 
activity.”193  Since the record in question was not relevant to an ongoing law 
enforcement activity, the court held that the FBI must expunge the record, 
contrary to the lower court’s determination.194   
Although the Ninth Circuit required expungement of one of the 
memoranda related to the plaintiff’s specific case, the Ninth Circuit left 
undisturbed the lower court’s decision that an agency can retain records 
containing “incidental” collection of First Amendment information as long 
as the surveillance itself is relevant to an ongoing law enforcement activity.195  
The district court had recognized that the FBI’s activities could potentially 
chill speech.  However, it asserted that “[t]o forbid ‘incidental’ surveillance 
of innocent people or to require excision of references to such people in 
surveillance records would be administratively cumbersome and damaging 
 
 189 By “incidental” collection of data, the court refers to data collected during the FBI’s observation 
and surveillance of plaintiff’s website postings and other First Amendment activities.  Garris, 937 
F.3d at 1300.  The term “incidental” is used in other cases, and colloquially, to refer to data about 
third parties collected as a result of law enforcement activity regarding other individuals. See, e.g., 
PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 
OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 
6 (2014) (describing that section 702 surveillance can result in the “incidental” collection of U.S. 
person communication where she communicates with a non-U.S. person who has been targeted). 
It is unclear whether the court accepts this broader usage. 
 190 Garris, 937 F.3d at 1294. 
 191 Id. at 1300.  
 192 Id. at 1299. 
 193 Id. at 1298. 
 194 Id. at 1300.   
 195 Id.; see Raimondo v. FBI, No. 13-CV-02295-JSC, 2018 WL 398236, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2018), 
aff'd sub nom. Garris v. FBI, 937 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 2019).   
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to the completeness and accuracy of the agency records.”196   Thus, the court 
interpreted the Privacy Act to allow “incidental” observation and collection 
of First Amendment data for valid law enforcement or national security 
reasons.197   
III. REMEDIES 
Free political speech is a cherished American freedom.  Yet, prioritizing 
it has paradoxically led to an assault on U.S. values.  As discussed above, 
U.S. law and Supreme Court doctrine constrain the United States’ ability to 
fight disinformation campaigns.  By upholding broad protections for both 
political speech and false speech, the Supreme Court created an environment 
in which Russian information warfare can flourish.  Other laws meant to 
protect American freedoms, like the Privacy Act, paradoxically limit the 
United States’ ability to protect the democracy that preserves those liberties.  
Scholars have proposed some solutions to these problems, such as 
modification of the incitement standard, use of counterspeech, and revision 
of current laws.  However, these fixes are insufficient to solve the problem of 
disinformation campaigns.  
The United States must fight information warfare on all fronts.  Reforms 
to doctrine, laws, and policies are needed to protect national security.  
Congress and courts must be careful to balance civil liberties with the need 
to protect national security in the Internet age.  Fortunately, many remedies 
for this First Amendment problem exist within current First Amendment 
doctrine.  Others are discoverable through creative policies that comport 
with existing First Amendment principles, including legislation, regulation of 
online platforms, and voluntary actions by online platforms.  
A.  Doctrinal Remedies 
1.  Distinguish the Internet and Social Media Contexts 
First Amendment jurisprudence must be reformed to account for the 
realities of the Internet and social media.  This distinction is a prerequisite 
for modifying current Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Internet as the 
public square.  As discussed above, the Supreme Court has tried to place the 
 
 196 Raimondo, 2018 WL 398236 at *16 (quoting MacPherson v. IRS, 803 F.2d 479, 484) (9th Cir. 1986). 
 197 Id. at *11–16. 
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Internet, broadly speaking, into the framework of the “new public square.”  
This has led to a doctrine based on flawed intellectual assumptions.  Courts 
should instead recognize the Internet and social media for the distinct legal 
animals that they are.  A platypus should not be likened to other mammals 
while it is laying eggs.  Similarly, the Internet and social media may be 
regulated when they behave in a manner distinct from traditional media and 
the public square, and the legal frameworks and doctrine that apply to them 
must be modified accordingly.  This is especially critical when national 
security is at stake.  
2.  Distinguish the Electoral Context 
Under current law, the U.S. Government might not have the legal 
authority to shut down, block, or mask First Amendment-protected speech 
by a U.S. person absent a clear showing that the U.S. person is operating as 
an unregistered agent of a foreign power.  As detailed above, limitations on 
freedom of expression in the United States, such as libel and obscenity, are 
narrow and tightly controlled.  Lies can be protected speech, especially when 
they relate to politics.  Courts have ruled that the First Amendment protects 
statements about political candidates that are arguably false but non-
defamatory, even if they seek to promote electoral interference.198  Few 
circumstances exist in which the government is permitted to determine 
whether or not speech is truthful.  As government activities increase in the 
domain of social media, it becomes more likely that the government will chill 
protected political speech, including political speech that is anti-government.  
However, the electoral context may merit special constitutional 
protections.  The First Amendment recognizes the primacy of political 
speech because of the importance of robust and free public discourse to a 
democracy.  Six of our twenty-seven constitutional amendments focus on the 
expansion of the right to vote and clarification that the vote should not be 
suppressed on discriminatory grounds, reflecting that free and fair elections 
are fundamental to American democracy.199  
 
 198 See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that political 
false-statement laws were unconstitutional); Rickert v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 831 
(Wash. 2007) (holding unconstitutional a statute that prohibits a person from sponsoring a political 
advertisement containing a false statement); State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! 
Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 699 (Wash. 1998) (holding a statute that prohibits sponsoring an 
advertisement with a false statement unconstitutional). 
 199 U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
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When the right to free speech clashes with the freeness and fairness of the 
electoral process, it follows that speech freedoms that may not be abridged 
in other areas may be balanced against a societal interest in the integrity of 
the electoral process.  Such restrictions might apply only to speech designed 
to threaten the integrity of the electoral process or to infringe upon the right 
to vote by suppressing turnout of certain groups.  Laws need not restrict 
political speech in debates or other contexts previously considered in First 
Amendment cases.  
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the First Amendment supports such a 
balancing test.  Packingham left room for the government to regulate the 
Internet and social media if such regulation passes strict scrutiny.200  
Elsewhere, in Brown v. Hartlage, the Court recognized the state’s “legitimate 
interest” in preserving the integrity of the electoral process.201  The Court 
noted that this might be enough to justify some limitations on speech, so long 
as “the restriction operate[s] without unnecessarily circumscribing protected 
expression.”202  The government has a clear and compelling interest in 
protecting the constitutionally protected right to vote, necessary to satisfy the 
strict scrutiny standard.  Thus, narrowly tailored legislation that limits some 
speech to protect the freeness and fairness of the electoral process or the right 
to vote might be constitutional.  Such limitations on foreign individuals’ 
speech are even more likely to survive strict scrutiny.203  Constitutional 
protections are weaker for foreign individuals than they are for U.S. persons, 
especially as related to the electoral process, as will be discussed below. 
The Court, moreover, has recognized that the government may 
permissibly limit defamatory, deliberate falsehoods, or speech made with 
reckless disregard for its truthfulness, because these types of speech may 
subvert the purposes of democratic government.  In Garrison v. Louisiana, the 
Court held that the First Amendment restricts a state’s power to impose 
criminal sanctions for criticism of official conduct of public officials, but left 
 
 200 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). 
 201 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982).  
 202 Id. at 53–54. 
 203 This Article follows Supreme Court practice and uses the terms “foreign citizen” and “alien” 
interchangeably to refer to individuals who are not citizens of the United States.  These terms do 
not include individuals who are dual citizens of a foreign country and the United States.  The term 
“foreign national” covers foreign citizens except for lawful permanent residents (LPRs, commonly 
known as “green card holders.”  See 2 U.S.C. § 441e(b) (2002). 
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room for other regulation of falsehoods in the electoral context.204  Garrison 
extended the New York Times v. Sullivan (“Sullivan”) “actual malice” standard 
for defamation to the criminal context.  In Garrison, a district attorney was 
convicted of criminal defamation for disparaging judges of the criminal 
district court during a press conference, with respect to a backlog of pending 
criminal cases.205  The district attorney asserted that the backlog of cases was 
due to the “inefficiency, laziness and excessive vacations of the judges,” 
which hindered his efforts to enforce vice laws, and said that the judges have 
“made it eloquently clear where their sympathies lie” regarding certain vice 
investigations.206  The attorney was convicted under the Louisiana Criminal 
Defamation Statute, which permitted “a finding of malice based on an intent 
merely to inflict harm, rather than an intent to inflict harm through 
falsehood.”207  The Louisana Supreme Court found that the district 
attorney’s statements impermissibly constituted an attack on the judge’s 
character, rather than official conduct.208  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed 
the Louisiana Supreme Court.  The Court noted that falsehoods are 
constitutionally protected to ensure that freedom of speech is not chilled.  
The Court further held that the criticism was of official conduct as well as 
personal character, noting that “anything which might touch on an official’s 
fitness for office is relevant.”209  
However, the Court noted that the Sullivan rule does not protect all 
political speech, nor all falsehoods.  In the context of defamation, knowing 
and reckless falsehoods are not protected by the First Amendment.210  A 
statute that criminalized an intent to inflict harm through falsehood—not 
just an intent to inflict harm—might be constitutional.211  For a speaker to 
face civil or criminal liability under such a statute, the public official must 
“establish[ ] that the utterance was false and that it was made with knowledge 
 
 204 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964). 
 205 Id. at 65. 
 206 Id. at 66. 
 207 Id. at 73.  
 208 Id. at 76; see also Volokh, supra note 145, at 1391 (“Garrison came eight months after New York Times 
v. Sullivan, which famously required a mens rea as to falsehood: A defendant could only be held 
liable if the defendant knew or was reckless about the falsity of the accusation.”).   
 209 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 77. 
 210 Id. at 73. 
 211 Id. at 74. 
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of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was false or true.”212  The 
Court explained that:  
Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful 
exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly 
and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like 
immunity . . . . That speech is used as a tool for political ends does not 
automatically bring it under the protective mantle of the Constitution.  For 
the use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of 
democratic government . . . . Calculated falsehood falls into that class of 
utterances which “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of 
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.”213  
Garrison arguably allows speakers to be held liable in the defamation context 
for falsehoods that meet a high standard of intent.  Garrison noted that a 
statute proscribing a private citizen’s “intent to inflict harm through 
falsehood” in the electoral context might survive strict scrutiny.214  This 
might apply to U.S. persons as well as foreigners.  Thus, Garrison’s holding 
may extend to proscribe defamatory fake news or false speech designed to 
inflict harm through falsehood, or a coordinated campaign of falsehoods, 
when actual malice is present. 
3.  Restrict False Speech Designed to Skew Elections 
Congress might also pass a narrowly tailored law that would prohibit false 
speech that is designed to attack the integrity of the electoral process.  As 
mentioned above, the First Amendment protects false speech.  Alvarez 
represents the U.S. Supreme Court’s strongest statement of the importance 
of protecting falsehoods.  However, Alvarez allows for a statute prohibiting 
knowing or reckless false speech intended to disrupt the integrity of a 
government process.215  
Alvarez leaves room for placing knowing or reckless falsehoods outside of 
First Amendment protection.  In overruling the Stolen Valor Act, the Court 
noted that the Stolen Valor Act targets falsity but nothing else.216  Other 
 
 212 Id. at 74. 
 213  Id. at 75 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 214  Id. at 73. 
 215 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 710 (2012).  
 216 Id. at 718. 
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cases in which the Court has noted that false speech has no constitutional 
value, or less constitutional value than truthful speech, involved another type 
of legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement.  For example, 
the Court has upheld statutes prohibiting false speech made in the context of 
fraud, or invasion of privacy.217  The Court noted that in those cases, “the 
falsity of the speech at issue was not irrelevant to our analysis, but neither 
was it determinative.”218  The Court discussed instances in which restrictions 
on false speech are permissible, such as perjury statutes, which are 
unquestionably constitutional because perjured testimony obstructs justice 
because it can cause a court to make a judgment premised on falsehoods.219  
Moreover, statutes that prohibit falsely representing that one is speaking on 
behalf of the government, or that prohibit impersonating a government 
official, do not simply restrict false speech but protect the integrity of a 
government process.220 
Thus, a narrowly tailored statute restricting speech intended to attack the 
integrity of the electoral process might pass strict scrutiny.  Here, the false 
speech itself would not be constitutionally protected only where such speech 
is designed to ensure that elections are not free and fair.  Under the test 
advanced in Alvarez, the government would have to be able to provide 
evidence that shows that the public’s general perception of the integrity of 
the electoral process “is diluted by false claims” such as those at issue,221 that 
counterspeech would be unable to “overcome the lie,”222 and that less 
restrictive measures were unhelpful.223  The Supreme Court would be more 
likely to uphold a statute restricting such speech by non-U.S. persons since 
constitutional protections are weaker when applied to foreigners.  However, 
Alvarez’s rationale suggests that such speech by U.S. persons could be 
restricted as well.   
Currently, the Supreme Court applies strict or exacting scrutiny to any 
legislation placing content-based restrictions on First Amendment freedoms.  
However, the Court must balance two competing First Amendment 
freedoms in its jurisprudence.  An individual’s First Amendment right to 
 
 217 Id.  
 218 Id. at 719.  
 219 Id. at 720–21.  
 220 Id.  
 221 Id. at 710. 
 222 Id. at 726. 
 223 Id. at 729. 
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political speech must be balanced against U.S. persons’ First Amendment 
right to political expression through free and fair elections.  Therefore, the 
Court should consider potential harm to American civil liberties from 
legislative restriction on an individual’s right to disinformation versus 
potential harm to society from interference with the ultimate expression of 
U.S. persons’ political speech via a free and fair electoral process.  As noted 
above, in Chaplinsky, the Court justified restrictions on incitement because 
“such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of 
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.”224  Following this standard, the Court might balance the social 
value of any disinformation “as a step to truth” against the social interest in 
free and fair elections.225  Such a balancing test would be consistent with the 
Court’s prior jurisprudence on free speech.  The Court has held the right to 
political speech to be paramount precisely because of the importance of free 
and robust political discourse to self-government.  It follows that protecting 
free and fair self-government would be a legitimate reason for restricting 
some speech.  The Court has also excluded from First Amendment 
protection some types of speech that are likely to lead to tangible harm to 
individuals or society, like incitement to imminent lawless action or fighting 
words.  Speech that is designed to undermine the integrity of U.S. elections 
is harmful not only to the right to self-government but also to national 
security.  The Supreme Court should not always prioritize national security 
over civil liberties.  However, the Court should not ignore national security 
concerns either, especially those that implicate constitutional concerns like 
free and fair elections.  In considering legislation and efforts responding to 
disinformation campaigns, the Court must consider the overall context and 
intent of the campaign and response, rather than merely an individual’s 
isolated act of speech. 
The Supreme Court may also adopt a new standard for evaluating 
harmful, blatantly false speech.  In his concurring opinion in Alvarez, Justice 
Breyer proposed an intermediate scrutiny approach in evaluating blatantly 
false speech that would replace the exacting scrutiny or strict scrutiny 
standards used in most free speech cases.226  As described by scholar Jeffrey 
 
 224 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 225 Id. 
 226 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 732 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
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C. Barnum,227 Breyer’s test considers the harmfulness of targeted speech228 
and the potential constitutional harm in the regulation of the targeted 
speech.229  The test also considers whether the government could have 
achieved its objective by less restrictive means.230  Building on Breyer’s 
approach, the Court could balance these factors to ensure that any statute 
regulating fake news and misinformation that is designed to skew elections 
does not create “disproportionate constitutional harm.”231  It could require 
the government to show that less restrictive means, such as counterspeech, 
would be insufficient to achieve the governmental interest.232  In the online 
context, the government might have to show that online platforms are not 
taking sufficient steps to eradicate fake news or disinformation.  Breyer’s 
pragmatic approach is limited by the difficulty of evaluating the effectiveness 
of counterspeech as a remedy for fake news or disinformation designed to 
skew the electoral process.  However, Breyer’s approach presents a useful 
starting point from which to develop constitutionally permissible regulation 
of false speech. 
4.  Restrict Speech by Foreign Individuals in the Electoral Context 
Restrictions narrowly tailored to prohibit threats to the electoral process 
by foreign individuals are especially likely to pass constitutional muster.  First 
Amendment protections are most robust where U.S. persons engage in non-
commercial speech, weaker when applied to foreign individuals inside the 
United States, and weakest when applied to foreign persons outside of the 
United States.233  Foreign individuals within the United States can generally 
enjoy First Amendment freedoms of speech.  However, the U.S. 
 
 227 Jeffrey C. Barnum, Encouraging Congress to Encourage Speech: Reflections on United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. 
L. REV. 527, 535–36 (2013) (deriving three major aspects of Breyer’s intermediate scrutiny test). 
 228 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 734–37. 
 229 Id. at 736. 
 230 Id. at 737. 
 231 Id. at 739.  
 232 Id.  
 233 See, e.g., Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 283 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 
1104 (2012) (explaining limits of constitutional protections for foreigner individuals); Daniel Fried 
& Alina Polyakova, Democratic Defense Against Disinformation, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 4 (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Democratic_Defense_Against_
Disinformation_FINAL.pdf (“First Amendment protections . . . seem weaker when applied to 
foreign persons, especially those outside the United States.”). 
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Government may limit the rights of foreign individuals when it comes to 
distributing propaganda and participating in the electoral process. 
The Supreme Court has permitted restrictions on speech that qualifies as 
foreign propaganda.  In Meese v. Keene, the Supreme Court upheld a provision 
of the Foreign Agent Registration Act (“FARA”) that required foreign agents 
seeking to distribute “political propaganda” within the United States to file 
with the Attorney General, report on the extent of dissemination, and label 
the material with the identity of the foreign agent and its registry with 
DOJ.234  Foreign propaganda is defined as any communication from a 
foreign source intended to influence U.S. foreign policy.  Because the Act 
only requires foreign agents to make disclosures that would allow the public 
to evaluate the propaganda better, the Court found that FARA’s provision 
“place[d] no burden on protected expression.”235  Although FARA may not 
burden the content of the expression, it does place an additional restriction 
on the ability of foreign agents to make certain types of speech.  Thus, Meese 
may leave an opening for additional regulation of speech by foreign agents, 
so long as it does not “burden protected expression.”  Under Meese, a 
requirement for registration of foreign agent-sponsored political 
advertisements or labeling of posts by foreign agents on social media 
platforms might be permissible. 
A recent campaign finance case guides how foreign speech in the 
electoral context might be constitutionally regulated.  In Bluman v. Federal 
Election Commission, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
upheld a federal statute barring foreign nationals staying temporarily in the 
United States from contributing to state and federal electoral candidates, 
contributing to national political parties and outside political groups, and 
making expenditures expressly advocating the election or defeat of a political 
candidate.236  Per the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, the case was heard 
by a three-judge panel, then appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which 
summarily affirmed.237  
Then-D.C. Circuit Court Judge Kavanaugh, writing for the three-judge 
panel, asserted that the government might bar foreign citizens, such as those 
 
 234 481 U.S. 465, 470–71, 485 (1987). 
 235 Id. at 480.  
 236 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 283 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 237 Id. at 282. 
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who are not lawful permanent residents of the United States,238 from 
participating in express advocacy in political campaigns or its functional 
equivalent if the foreign citizen’s goal is to influence how voters cast their 
ballots.239  In the campaign finance context, an express advocacy expenditure 
is one that funds “express campaign speech” or its “functional equivalent.”240  
An advertisement is the “functional equivalent” of express advocacy if it “is 
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote 
for or against a specific candidate.”241  Kavanaugh highlights that express 
advocacy expenditures “finance advertisements, get-out-the-vote drives, 
rallies, candidate speeches, and the myriad other activities by which 
candidates appeal to potential voters.”242  Express advocacy is distinct from 
issue advocacy, or advocating for a particular political position or issue. 
The court noted the thorny nature of the legal question at issue, which 
implicated both First Amendment rights and the strict scrutiny they 
ordinarily receive, and a matter of foreign affairs and national security that 
would ordinarily be subject to deferential rational basis review.243  However, 
the court concluded that the statute would survive strict scrutiny, which 
meant that the court did not need to decide the appropriate standard of 
review.244  After reviewing caselaw on the rights of foreign citizens in the 
United States, the court concluded that the caselaw reveals a 
“straightforward principle:  It is fundamental to the definition of our national 
political community that foreign citizens do not have a constitutional right to 
participate in, and thus may be excluded from, activities of democratic self-
government.”245  Since political contributions and express-advocacy 
expenditures are an integral part of the U.S. electoral process, these 
campaign activities are part of the process of democratic self-government.  
Limiting foreign participation in the electoral process is “part of the 
sovereign’s obligation to preserve the basic conception of a political 
community,” of which foreigners are, by definition, not a part.246   
 
 238 See 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b) (2017) (defining foreign national for election contribution regulations). 
 239 Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 288. 
 240 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 456 (2007). 
 241 Id. at 469–70. 
 242 Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 288.  
 243 Id. at 285. 
 244 Id. at 285–86. 
 245 Id. at 288. 
 246 Id. at 287. 
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The court in Bluman specifically did not decide whether Congress could 
constitutionally extend the statutory ban on express advocacy by foreigners 
to lawful permanent residents.  Nor did the court decide whether Congress 
could prohibit foreign nationals from engaging in issue advocacy and other 
speech outside contributions to candidates and parties, express-advocacy 
expenditures, and donations247 to outside groups to be used for contributions 
to candidates and parties and express-advocacy expenditures.  The court 
further cautioned the government that seeking criminal penalties for the 
statute would require proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the law.248 
Following Bluman, Congress could plausibly create legislation to ban 
foreigners from engaging in express advocacy in political campaigns.  Bluman 
suggests that a ban on electoral participation by foreigners is permissible if its 
scope is limited to regulation of express advocacy or its functional equivalent.  
Under Bluman, it seems that the United States has a compelling interest in 
limiting the actions of foreign citizens in American self-government, 
including preventing foreign influence over the U.S. political process.  
However, no court has defined what it means for an operation to be 
“designed to influence our electoral process.”  In the campaign finance 
context, spending money on political advertisements is designed to influence 
the election.  The same cannot be said as easily for social media posts and 
tweets.  
Still, legislation prohibiting express advocacy by foreigners would not 
have prohibited all of the Russian disinformation campaigns.  Bluman 
construed the foreign spending ban as express advocacy, but not issue 
advocacy.  Issue advocacy is speech that does not expressly advocate the 
election or defeat of a specific candidate.  Much of the Russian 
disinformation campaign involved disseminating false news about Hillary 
Clinton or magnifying societal divides about issues like police violence, which 
does not amount to express advocacy for the election or defeat of a particular 
candidate.  Moreover, even a Russian-sponsored advertisement promising to 
 
 247 Foreign nationals cannot contribute to, or make expenditures in connection with, a U.S. election 
of any level.  52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2012); see also 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(i) (2019) (expanding regulation 
of the political expenditures of foreign nationals); Fed. Election Comm’n, Advisory Opinion 2000-
17 (July 28, 2000), http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/2000-17.pdf (barring domestic subsidiaries of 
foreign corporations from establishing political action committees if financed by a foreign parent 
company or if individual foreign nationals participate in its operations).  
 248 Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292. 
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“Make America Great Again” might be considered issue advocacy 
depending on the context.  Notably, the court in Bluman did “not decide 
whether Congress could prohibit foreign nationals from engaging in speech 
other than contributions.”249  Bluman thus cannot be read to support bans on 
lobbying or issue advocacy by foreigners.250  However, Bluman’s reasoning 
that foreign citizens can be excluded from the activities of self-government to 
preserve a national political community suggests that additional restrictions 
on foreign nationals’ participation in the electoral process may be 
appropriate.  
To restrict these forms of political expression, Congress would have to 
show that the restriction furthers the compelling interest in preventing 
foreign influence over the U.S. political process and could achieve this goal 
at a cost that imposed a tolerable level of collateral damage to civil liberties.  
The legislation must be narrowly tailored so as not to include protected forms 
of speech.  A balancing test to evaluate such legislation should consider the 
identity of the speaker, the intent of the speaker, the nature and extent of the 
restriction on speech, the type and potential gravity of harm to the electoral 
process, and the type and gravity of potential harm to the speaker if the 
speech were restricted. 
As mentioned above, Garrison might permit the government to proscribe 
a private citizen’s speech made with an “intent to inflict harm through 
falsehood” in the electoral context, regardless of whether the speaker is a U.S. 
person or a foreigner.251  The unique characteristics of social media suggest 
that greater regulation of speech in the electoral context might be allowed 
irrespective of the speaker’s identity.  The Court must reconsider the balance 
of considerations that have produced its First Amendment jurisprudence.  If 
the target of the legislation is a U.S. person, a different calculus applies 
because of potential restrictions on U.S. persons’ civil liberties.  If the target 
is a non-U.S. person, the balance of considerations would be different 
because constitutional protections are weaker for non-U.S. persons, 
especially if they are outside the United States.  
 
 249 Id. 
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 251 See discussion infra p. 139. 
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5.  A Note on Principal, Agent, and Attribution Problems 
Although regulation of speech by foreigners in the electoral context may 
be constitutionally permissible, a question remains as to what counts as 
speech by foreigners.  When a state does not overtly sponsor media outlets 
or actors, these entities fall into a legal gray zone.  Online trolls, for example, 
fall into a gray area between individuals expressing their opinions and semi-
organized non-state actors following a particular foreign state’s political 
agenda.252  The line between online activists’ free speech and a foreign state’s 
interference in elections, therefore, may be thin.253  Attribution of an 
individual’s conduct to a non-state actor can pose even more legal obstacles.  
Further complications exist when information warfare is conducted by a 
foreign state using U.S. servers.  For example, Russian actors conducted 
information warfare campaigns using U.S.-based servers.  Intelligence 
collection in such a scenario would involve investigation of U.S. corporate 
property and possibly the collection of information about that corporation in 
addition to individual U.S. persons.  A full discussion of the corporate legal 
issues and intelligence-related legal issues lies beyond the scope of this Article.  
However, this scenario highlights the complexities of the legal questions 
involved in combatting information warfare. 
Another legal problem arises when considering foreign agents who are 
U.S. persons.  Bluman’s holding is currently limited to foreign individuals.  
However, it is entirely foreseeable that an adversary state or non-state actor 
would employ U.S. persons in an information warfare campaign.  Legislation 
designed to combat electoral interference would need to delineate limitations 
on their conduct.254 
 
 252 See, e.g., Mike Wendling & Will Yates, NATO Says Viral News Outlet is Part of “Kremlin Misinformation 
Machine”, BBC NEWS (Feb. 11, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-38936812 
(discussing opposing views on independence of Russian-funded media outlet Sputnik); see also 
Andrew Higgins, Effort to Expose Russia’s ‘Troll Army’ Draws Vicious Retaliation, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/world/europe/russia-finland-nato-trolls.html 
(reporting on harassment of journalist investigating Russia’s “troll army”).  
 253 EUR. PARL. ASS., DOC. 14523, LEGAL CHALLENGES RELATED TO HYBRID WAR AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS, at 8 (2018), www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/XRef-DocDetails-
EN.asp?fileid=24547 (follow PDF hyperlink) (noting that difficulties of accountability for online 
speech and problems attributing the speech of individuals to foreign states makes it challenging to 
determine what qualifies as freedom of expression versus foreign electoral interference). 
 254 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a (2017), (listing, among other restrictions, that the government cannot 
intentionally target persons who are within the United States or U.S. persons (citizen or LPR), and 
any surveillance must be conducted consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the targeting and 
minimization procedures detailed in § 1881a(d) and (e)). 
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Any effective legislation that would protect the U.S. electoral process 
from foreign interference must be able to prohibit certain speech or conduct 
by agents of foreign adversaries.  Yet, determining who qualifies as an agent 
of a foreign state is complicated, and determining who qualifies as an agent 
of a non-state actor is even harder.  Any legislation created to address 
disinformation campaigns would be incomplete without specifying what link 
between principal and agent is required to restrict certain free speech rights.  
B.  Reforming Surveillance Laws 
To succeed in the fight against information warfare, the U.S. 
Government will likely need to engage in some degree of surveillance of 
social media.  To do so, it will need to modify its statutes involving 
surveillance of Americans’ First Amendment activity.  Congress must tread 
carefully when doing so in order not to repeat the mistakes of the PATRIOT 
Act, a major attempt to modify U.S. surveillance laws after 9/11. 
1.  Lessons from the PATRIOT ACT 
Congress passed the PATRIOT Act shortly after 9/11 “[t]o deter and 
punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance 
law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.”255  The Act 
modified prior surveillance laws, setting new conditions under which the 
government could electronically monitor communications.256  Newly 
legalized surveillance methods soon were applied domestically and were not 
used exclusively to combat terrorism.  The Act was roundly criticized for 
weakening American civil liberties in the name of national security.  By 2004, 
over 330 communities and 4 states passed resolutions formally objecting to 
the PATRIOT Act, primarily because of civil liberties concerns.257  
Many critics saw the PATRIOT Act as an overbroad law that gave law 
enforcement agencies powers to surveil Americans for reasons having 
 
 255 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 272 (2001) [hereinafter 
“PATRIOT ACT” or “the Act”]. 
 256 Nathan C. Henderson, Note, The Patriot Act’s Impact on The Government’s Ability to Conduct Electronic 
Surveillance of Ongoing Domestic Communications, 52 DUKE L.J. 179, 179 (2002). 
 257 John T. Soma et al., Balance of Privacy vs. Security:  A Historical Perspective of the USA PATRIOT Act, 31 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 285, 326–27 (2005) (citing List of Communities that have Passed 
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nothing to do with fighting terrorism.258  The Act was, in fact, used to surveil 
Americans for illegal activities other than terrorism.259  Several provisions of 
the Act also allegedly violated First Amendment freedoms.  For example, 
section 214 permitted the government to execute trap and trace orders 
against individuals so long as their activities were “not expressly within the 
First Amendment.”260  Critics argued that the term “expressly” could be 
interpreted narrowly, allowing government surveillance of a broad swath of 
speech.261  The Act also altered the primary purpose for surveillance 
requirement:  requests needed no longer assert that they had the primary 
purpose of intelligence gathering, but simply “a significant purpose.”262  
Again, this increased the powers of law enforcement to surveil expressive 
activity for purposes other than fighting terrorism.  
Additionally, the Act modified the Pen Register Act263 to facilitate the 
government’s compulsion of online platforms to conduct prospective 
envelope surveillance on its behalf, including records of dialing, routing, and 
signaling information.264  The government would be able to see websites 
visited and subject lines of emails, with the standard of proof being a mere 
“relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”265  Critics argued that the 
Act abused civil liberties by only requiring minimal judicial review and not 
providing clear guidelines on how the intelligence community should avoid 
collecting content related to First Amendment Activity.266  Congress 
amended some of the Act in response to these and other critiques. 
 
 258 For more discussion of the PATRIOT Act’s flaws, see generally Kyle Welch, The Patriot Act and Crisis 
Legislation:  The Unintended Consequences of Disaster Lawmaking, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 481, 481 (2015) 
(“When faced with [crises], the nation’s democratically elected representatives have used disaster 
as fuel to propel previously unacceptable, even unconstitutional laws.”); see also Orin S. Kerr, Internet 
Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act:  The Big Brother that Isn’t, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 607 (2003) (“The 
Act’s surveillance provisions proved so controversial that Congress added a sunset provision.”).  
 259 See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomm. Records and 
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (permitting grant of cell site information relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation 
involving the illegal sale of contraband pursuant to the combined authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3121 
and the Stored Communications Act).  The PATRIOT Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 3121.  
PATRIOT Act § 216. 
 260 Soma et al., supra note 257257, at 303 (citing PATRIOT Act § 214).  
 261 See id. at 303–04.  
 262 PATRIOT Act § 218.  
 263 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (1986).  
 264 PATRIOT Act § 216.  
 265 Id. 
 266 Jennifer C. Evans, Comment, Hijacking Civil Liberties:  The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 33 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 933, 988 (2002).  
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Legislation to help combat information warfare would likely arouse even 
more controversy than the PATRIOT Act.  Surveillance to fight information 
warfare would necessarily involve delving beyond “envelope information” 
into the content of electronic communications.  In light of Supreme Court 
precedent and lessons learned from the PATRIOT Act, legislation that 
would increase government surveillance capabilities to fight information 
warfare must be carefully crafted to balance First Amendment rights and 
national security. 
2.  Improving Surveillance Laws and the Privacy Act 
Legislation that would increase government surveillance capabilities must 
be narrowly tailored to achieve a specific national security purpose.  The 
surveillance process must include checks to ensure that civil liberties are not 
violated.  However, such checks must not be so onerous as to prevent 
agencies acting for a national security purpose from moving quickly to fight 
rapid and constantly changing information threats.  
First, legislation must be tailored to specific national security concerns.  
Unlike the PATRIOT Act, the legislation must not become like a Christmas 
tree, where provisions with other purposes are attached without much 
connection, for other powers that law enforcement agencies and national 
security agencies would like to wield.  The legislation must articulate a 
specific national security purpose that any related surveillance would 
support.  For example, legislation could tailor the collection of data related 
to U.S. persons’ First Amendment activities to collection related or incidental 
to national security and law enforcement efforts to protect U.S. elections 
against influence by foreign powers.  Legislation must specify which agencies 
will conduct that surveillance, and what steps they will need to follow to gain 
permission to conduct that surveillance.  To avoid previous problems 
associated with the Privacy Act, Congress should ensure that the legislation 
covers agencies beyond those who traditionally have law enforcement and 
intelligence-collection capacities.  The legislation might include the DOS, 
DHS, and DOJ, given the necessity of a whole-of-government approach to 
fighting information warfare.  Moreover, the legislation should contain a 
provision that allows arms of additional agencies to conduct necessary 
electronic surveillance on an expedited basis, without full amendment of the 
Act.  
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Legislators must build checks into the process to ensure that federal 
agencies are accessing U.S. persons’ First Amendment information only for 
the aforementioned narrowly tailored national security purposes.  The 
legislation should also grant the agencies the power to access only the 
information necessary to achieve the narrowly tailored and specified national 
security purpose.  The legislation should require agencies first to research 
open-source data on U.S. persons whenever it is available and if time allows 
it to do so, given the potential urgency of a national security concern.  
Agencies should be required to get a court order or a warrant from a court 
of competent jurisdiction to conduct prospective envelope or content 
surveillance of Internet communications.  A high threshold should be 
required to obtain the court order or warrant, along with stringent judicial 
review of the government’s application.  The court should issue the order 
only if the government can provide “specific and articulable facts” showing 
reasonable ground to believe that the content of the electronic 
communication is relevant and material to an ongoing investigation 
supporting the specific national security purpose.267  
In this regard, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) 
provides a useful model for allowing surveillance of foreign agents without 
unduly infringing on the civil liberties of U.S. persons.268  For a judge to 
permit government surveillance under FISA, she must find probable cause 
that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and probable 
cause that the facility is used by the target.269  The judge may consider the 
target’s past activities and any facts and circumstances relating to the target’s 
current or future activities.270  However, the judge cannot accept the 
government’s assertion that someone is an agent of a foreign power solely 
based on activities protected by the First Amendment.271  Because FISA 
 
 267 This language is derived from the Stored Communications Act.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (1986). 
 268 See generally Jill I. Goldenziel & Manal Cheema, Protecting First Amendment Rights in the Fight Against 
Disinformation:  Lessons Learned from FISA, 79 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that the civil 
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requires access to U.S. persons’ information to combat information warfare).  
 269 50 U.S.C. §1805(a) (2017). 
 270 Id. § 1805(b).  
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F. Supp. 2d 538, 549 (E.D. Va. 2006) (holding that a judge can rely in part on these activities as 
long as there is probable cause that the target may be involved in unlawful clandestine activities). 
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forces the government to meet specific standards before an order based on 
an individual’s First Amendment activities can be issued, FISA’s provisions 
(50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885) are not so overly broad that they chill an 
individual’s First Amendment rights.272  That said, if the target of the 
surveillance is not a U.S. person or her activities are not protected by the 
First Amendment, a wiretap will not violate FISA if the target is labeled as a 
foreign power based solely on her First Amendment activities.273  
A full and informed debate on any legislation or modifications to existing 
legislation is a must.  This makes it especially important for Congress to act 
before a new presidential electoral cycle when the threat of imminent acts of 
information warfare could spur hasty legislation.  Finally, a sunset clause 
within any legislation must be included to prevent adverse, long-reaching 
encroachments on civil liberties, especially ones that are unforeseen.   
Congress should reform the Privacy Act along similar lines.  It should 
expand the Act to allow agencies acting for a national security purpose, in 
addition to law enforcement agencies or agencies acting for law enforcement 
purposes, to access U.S. persons’ communications.  Once again, the DOS 
and the DHS should be added to the traditional list of law enforcement 
agencies, with a clause providing a process to allow the DOD to participate 
in exceptional circumstances,274 and for additional agencies to participate 
without a revision of the bill.  However, appropriate checks should be added 
to the process to prevent surveillance powers from becoming too broad.  In 
 
 272 See United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1314–15 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (asserting that because 
the judge, not the Executive branch, makes the finding that the target is truly an agent of a foreign 
power, and that FISA admonishes that no U.S. person can be considered an agent solely based on 
her First Amendment activities, FISA is not overbroad); see also ACLU Found. of S. Cal. v. Barr, 
952 F.2d 457, 471–72 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (explaining First Amendment limitations on FISA 
investigations).  
 273 See United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1194–95 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d mem., 729 F.2d 
1444 (2d Cir. 1983) and aff’d on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 
1984) (asserting that because no U.S. person was the target of the surveillance pursuant to FISA, 
the First Amendment caveat was not implicated); see also United States v. Sattar, No. 02 CR. 395 
JGK., 2003 WL 22137012, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003) (upholding FISA determination of probable 
cause against First Amendment challenge based on activities not protected by the First 
Amendment).  
 274 See Exec. Order No. 12333 § 2.3(b), 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941(Dec. 4, 1981) (permitting intelligence 
collection on foreigners within the U.S. but not intelligence collection “undertaken for the purpose 
of acquiring information concerning the domestic activities of United States persons”); see also id. § 
2.4 (requiring the IC to “use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible within the United 
States or directed against United States persons abroad”). 
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light of the potential for chilling speech, lawmakers should revisit the 
necessity of the current blanket exemptions for law enforcement and 
determine whether court orders and judicial review should be necessary at 
some steps in an investigative process. 
Any laws allowing surveillance of U.S. persons’ First Amendment 
activities must have adequate disclosure provisions.  The DOJ’s Digital 
Cyber Task Force Report outlines six situations in which information the 
Department collects concerning foreign influence operations may be 
disclosed to the general public.  Three of them are to alert (1) unwitting 
recipients of covert support as necessary to assist in countering, (2) online 
platforms whose services are used to disseminate propaganda or 
disinformation, and (3) the public or other affected individuals, when doing 
so outweighs other countervailing concerns.275  The DOJ asserts that 
disclosing influence operations to the public is a meaningful way to neutralize 
their effectiveness and mitigate their harm.  These concepts were 
incorporated into Section 90.730 of Title 9 of the Justice Manual.276  
Disclosure of activities will only occur when the DOJ can attribute them to 
foreign sources with high confidence.  However, the DOJ may choose not to 
disclose if such a disclosure would be counterproductive, such as 
inadvertently amplifying the message.277  
These disclosure guidelines should be incorporated into any statute 
involving surveillance to fight information warfare.  Since disclosure may 
interfere with an ongoing investigation, it will not always be possible to 
require national security actors to disclose when U.S. persons’ First 
Amendment activities are being surveilled.  However, agencies should be 
encouraged to make such disclosures when possible, especially with the 
purpose of actively engaging Americans in the fight against information 
warfare. 
C.  Sanctions 
Sanctions may provide some deterrence against electoral interference.  
Section 2 of the 2018 Executive Order on Election Interference authorizes 
 
 275 CYBER DIGITAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 16–17.  
 276 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-90.730 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-
90000-national-security#9-90.730.  
 277 Id.  
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sanctions against entities deemed to have engaged in election interference.278  
The Secretary of the Treasury may block their property under U.S. 
jurisdiction of foreign agents if they (1) “engaged in, sponsored, concealed, 
or otherwise were complicit in foreign interference,” (2) “materially assisted, 
sponsored,” or supported the election interference, or (3) “acted or purported 
to act for or on behalf of those whose property or property interests were 
blocked pursuant to the order.”279  Finally, section 3 allows the White House 
to implement sanctions and “any other measures authorized by law” beyond 
those who interfered and their facilitators, such as business entities.280  The 
Secretaries of State and Treasury will recommend these sanctions to the 
President, alongside an assessment of the effect of these sanctions so that 
sanctions are “appropriately calibrated to the scope of the foreign 
interference identified.”281  
Sanctions may be a useful tool for fighting information warfare, and 
Congress may wish to consider expanding them.  Their effectiveness is 
limited, however, by the difficulty of determining the source of election 
interference and the scope of that foreign interference.  Moreover, 
retroactive sanctions like those in the Executive Order are punitive but 
inadequate to prevent electoral interference. 
D.  Fighting Foreign-Sponsored Paid Advertisements 
The government can also regulate paid social media advertisements by 
foreign actors designed to influence the electoral process, just as it does on 
traditional media sites.  For example, the government can require that any 
paid political advertisements include a clear statement of who paid for or is 
disseminating a message.  Registration requirements for political users would 
be similar to those required for traditional media.  
Following Bluman, any advertisement that “is susceptible of no reasonable 
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate” would constitute express advocacy and therefore be prohibited 
by the BCRA.282  Extending Bluman’s rationale, other forms of express 
advocacy by foreign actors can be prohibited altogether.  Foreign-paid 
 
 278 Exec. Order No. 13,848, 83 Fed. Reg. 179 (Sept. 14, 2018). 
 279 Id. § 2(a).  
 280 Id. § 3(b). 
 281 Id.  
 282 Fed. Elections Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007). 
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advertisements designed to influence the electoral process that fall short of 
express advocacy can also be regulated.  Such advertisements might be 
registered as propaganda and regulated accordingly.  Foreign advertisers 
might also be required to disclose the source of the advertisement’s funding, 
just as other U.S. advertisers are required to do when they post 
advertisements on particular electoral issues.  Since legislation regulating 
paid political advertisements, whether paid for by foreigners or U.S. 
nationals, would be political speech and content-based, it must satisfy strict 
scrutiny.  Such legislation must, therefore, be narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling state interest.  
To satisfy the tailoring prong, legislation regulating paid online political 
advertisements must be drafted carefully so as not to be overbroad.  The 
January 2019 case of Washington Post v. McManus illustrates the difficulties in 
creating a narrowly-tailored registration statute.283  In McManus, a federal 
district court struck down Maryland’s Online Electioneering Transparency 
and Accountability Act (“OETA”) on First Amendment grounds.  The 
OETA was enacted to help combat events like the 2016 Russian 
disinformation campaign.  The Act required social media and news sites to 
self-publish an ad-buyer’s identity and the total amount paid.  The platform 
must post this information in a searchable format within forty-eight hours of 
the purchase, place it in a “clearly identifiable location” on the platform’s 
website, and keep it there for at least one year following the relevant general 
election.284  
Despite finding that the state had compelling interests in passing the 
statute, the court found that the legislation was not narrowly tailored.  Citing 
Bluman, the court asserted that Maryland had compelling interests in 
preventing foreign governments and their nationals from interfering in their 
elections, informing voters about the source of online advertisements, and 
deterring corruption.285  However, the statute was both over- and under-
inclusive because it regulated more speech than is necessary and did not 
regulate the main tools that foreign operatives used to disrupt the 2016 
elections.286  The statute’s publication requirement was most problematic 
 
 283 Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272 (D. Md. 2019). 
 284 Id. at 283. 
 285 Id. at 298–99 (citing Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285–86 (D.D.C. 
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 286 Id. at 299.  
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because it compelled online platforms to post state-required information on 
their websites, “. . . treading on their First Amendment-protected interest in 
controlling the content of their own publications.”287  Further, the statute was 
redundant and unnecessary since Maryland campaign finance laws already 
prescribed less restrictive means of obtaining the same information.288  
Moreover, the state inspection requirement was over-inclusive.  The 
statute covered all online platforms, including news sites.  However, no news 
site has been identified as having run a single foreign-sourced paid political 
advertisement.289  Therefore, the Act was overbroad beyond its purpose of 
stopping foreign interference in elections because it included news sites in its 
ambit.  The requirement also requires the media to enact the government’s 
regulatory scheme, which is antithetical to the role of a free press that is 
meant to serve as a check on government excesses.290  Finally, the Act did 
not advance its purpose.  In particular, since the Act placed the burden on 
the advertisement’s buyer to notify online publishers, a buyer could withhold 
notice.  That would, in turn, absolve the publisher from disclosing 
information about the advertisement.  An advertisement’s buyer might also 
provide false information, and the publisher would be protected by the good-
faith provision in the Act.291  The Act’s provisions thus did not target the 
foreign efforts that it purported to target and was not well-designed to catch 
foreign operatives.292  
As of this writing, McManus is the only federal decision on legislation to 
regulate paid political advertisements in the wake of the Russian electoral 
threat.  Several other state legislatures have passed similar legislation or have 
it pending.293  McManus is currently being appealed.294  It remains to be seen 
whether other courts will follow the Maryland District Court’s approach.  
Learning from McManus, future drafters should avoid redundancy in 
campaign finance provisions and narrowly tailor the statute to achieving 
 
 287 Id. at 300. 
 288 Id.  
 289 Id. at 301. 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. at 305.  
 292 Id. at 303–04.  
 293 See Democracy Protection Act, 2018 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 59, pt. JJJ (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. 
Elec. §§ 14-100, 14-106 to -107, 14-126); see also 2018 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 304 (West) (amending 
state campaign finance laws, including Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17A.005). 
 294 Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272 (D. Md. 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-1132 (Feb. 4, 
2019).  
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specific goals.  A given statute need not address every aspect of the Russian 
disinformation campaign; however, it must specify what aspects of 
information warfare the statute aims to combat, and how.  
Other courts may not share McManus’s concern with requiring news and 
social media sites to post a reasonably short state-sponsored disclaimer or list 
of funders of paid advertisements, on their sites.  To support its reasoning 
that such a requirement would violate press freedoms, McManus cited cases 
that forbade a state from requiring publishers to print content with which 
they did not agree.  In our view, a government requirement for a publisher 
to print factually neutral information, such as a disclaimer or a list of 
advertisers, would not impinge on a publisher’s editorial freedom.295  The 
Federal Government requires paid political advertisements on traditional 
media to include appropriate disclaimers.  To require a different standard 
for paid political advertisements online would be inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of social media as similar to traditional media.  
Even if the Court were to distinguish social media and traditional media, as 
we have suggested above, disclaimers on political advertisements should not 
receive different First Amendment protections in online and television or 
print contexts.296  If anything, disclaimers on Internet sites should be less 
onerous for an online publisher than they are for traditional media outlets, 
since space and timing are nearly unlimited commodities online while they 
are scarce in television and print media.  Thus, states may be able to create 
legislation to regulate paid advertisements that are appropriately narrowly 
tailored to achieve a specific, compelling state interest.  
E.  Fighting Fake News 
As discussed above, some fake news may be protected political speech.  
Jurisprudence does recognize the possibility that false speech by foreigners in 
the electoral context may not receive full First Amendment protection.  The 
 
 295 The requirement in McManus would seem to be such a factually neutral disclaimer; the court does 
not elaborate on its reasoning for conflating a requirement of a publisher to provide facts 
contextualizing an advertisement with a requirement that editors publish content with which they 
may not agree. 
 296 Disclosure is required of “electioneering communications,” which currently only covers broadcast, 
cable, or satellite television and does not include internet communications.  11 C.F.R. § 100.26 
(2006); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 368 (2010) (upholding disclaimer 
requirements).  
 
November 2019] THE NEW FIGHTING WORDS? 143 
   
 
Supreme Court should clarify this standard, and jurisdictions would do well 
to attempt to draft laws that would force courts to explore the right doctrinal 
balance between First Amendment freedom of speech and preserving the 
integrity of the political process.  
However, defamation law provides an existing cause of action for those 
targeted by fake news stories, especially political candidates.297  If fake news 
is “limited to intentional or knowingly false statements, it is reasonable to 
conclude that such statements would satisfy the intent requirement for 
defamation claims.”298  As discussed earlier, in Garrison v. Louisiana, the Court 
held that the heightened “actual malice” standard, as outlined in Sullivan,299 
applies to both civil and criminal libel cases.  The statute may only punish 
false statements if made “with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless 
disregard of whether they are true or false.”300  The Court stated that the 
case they were considering did not consist solely of private defamation—
which would require only a showing of negligence301—but public defamation 
because the statement was directed at a public official.302  When harmful false 
publications of fact concern a public figure, the publisher must have acted 
with “actual malice.”303  In other words, the claimant must show that a false 
publication was made with a “high degree of awareness of . . . probable 
falsity.”304  “There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that 
the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his 
publication.”305  Of course, such a statute must not prohibit satire or 
parody.306  When considering United States v. Alvarez, it appears to be the case 
that “conscious falsehoods that cause legally cognizable harm are not 
 
 297 See Joel Timmer, Fighting Falsity:  Fake News, Facebook, and the First Amendment, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 669, 683–84 (2017) (explaining that the applicability of defamation law with regards to 
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 298 David O. Klein & Joshua R. Wueller, Fake News:  A Legal Perspective, 20 J. INTERNET L. 7 (2017) 
(emphasis in original). 
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 300 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76–78 (1964). 
 301 The private plaintiff must normally establish that the false statement was made to a third party and 
it was of such a nature that it harmed or would tend to harm the plaintiff’s reputation.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558–559 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  
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protected,” but unintentional false speech is protected even if there is 
cognizable harm.307  Where there is consciously false speech with no legally 
cognizable harm, however, the speech is protected.  Thus, “consciously false 
speech turns on an assessment of harm.”308  The speech must be knowingly 
or recklessly false and produce some legally cognizable harm to produce a 
successful defamation suit.  
However, defamation laws have limitations in effectively combatting fake 
news or its harm.  A person can only pursue defamation claims against fake 
news stories about themselves.  In the electoral context, for instance, 
candidates who are the subject of defamatory fake news can pursue 
defamation claims against providers.  To illustrate, Hillary Clinton could not 
bring a defamation claim against the story that the Pope endorsed Trump, 
even if it adversely affected her campaign.  And the Pope, who could bring 
the claim, may be reluctant to do so for the time and expense involved as 
well as the fear of drawing more attention to the story.309  The author of a 
defamatory statement may also be anonymous or live outside the jurisdiction 
of the United States, further impeding prosecution.310  Finally, a defamation 
lawsuit is unlikely to be resolved before the election, so readers will not be 
informed of the veracity of the “news” promptly.  
Moreover, section 230 of the CDA protects interactive online providers 
from defamation claims where the information was “provided by” another 
Internet user.311  Under traditional defamation law, a publisher can be liable 
for defamatory statements without their knowledge of the statement’s 
inclusion.312  But, with section 230, online providers have “federal immunity 
to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for 
 
 307 Martin H. Redish & Kyle Voils, False Commercial Speech and the First Amendment:  Understanding the 
Implications of the Equivalency Principle, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 792 (2017); see also United 
States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718–19 (2012) (discussing the protection of false speech under the 
First Amendment).  
 308 Redish & Voils, supra note 307, at 793.  
 309 See Timmer, supra note 297, at 685–86 (explaining barriers for defamation plaintiffs).  
 310 See Andrea Butler, Note, Protecting the Democratic Role of the Press:  A Legal Solution to Fake News, 96 
WASH. U. L. REV. 419, 436 (2018) (explaining barriers for defamation plaintiffs). 
 311 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2017); see also Klein & Wueller, supra note 298, at 7 (noting, however, “the 
CDA does not afford protection to the original author of a defamatory or otherwise tortious 
publication”); Timmer, supra note 297, at 687-88 (discussing the barrier § 230 poses to defamation 
plaintiffs).  
 312 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing the state of the law 
prior to the enaction of the CDA). 
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information originating with a third-party user of the service.”313  Thus, if 
the website “does not contribute to the development” of the fake news, it 
cannot be liable for the defamatory statements posted by third parties.314  
Defamation statutes may still provide some utility in fighting fake news.  
For a defamation statute to regulate fake news or misinformation, it must 
specifically identify the harm “that falls outside what is already 
actionable.”315  A statute that did not identify such specific harm would have 
the potential to limit First Amendment freedoms.316  
F.  Fighting Divisive Propaganda 
Of the three main tactics of the Russian disinformation campaign, 
divisive propaganda is the hardest to fight.  As discussed above, much divisive 
propaganda is protected by the First Amendment as political speech.  
Changing Supreme Court doctrine to allow regulation of foreign speech in 
the electoral context, following the suggestions above, will help fight divisive 
propaganda.  However, laws that restrict government surveillance of the First 
Amendment activities of U.S. persons still pose a large hurdle to fighting 
divisive propaganda.  These laws must be reformed to allow the U.S. 
Government to find and prosecute those undermining the U.S. electoral 
process while still protecting the civil liberties of U.S. persons.  
1. Reforming the Foreign Agent Registration Act 
FARA has the potential to help fight information warfare.  Given First 
Amendment protections, the United States probably cannot ban media 
outlets that are overtly sponsored by foreign states—even if they are 
disseminating extremist or disruptive propaganda.  However, the United 
States can identify them as “propaganda vehicles” and require them to 
 
 313 Id. at 330; see also id. (“[L]awsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a 
publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, 
postpone or alter content—are barred.”).  
 314 See Butler, supra note 310, at 433 (noting that “[a]ll federal courts to consider the issue . . . have 
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 315 See Dallas Flick, Comment, Combatting Fake News:  Alternatives to Limiting Social Misinformation and 
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register under FARA.317  Under FARA, acting as an agent of a foreign power 
requires registration and doing so without registration can be criminal. 
FARA requires persons who act as agents of foreign principals to make 
periodic public disclosure of their relationship with the foreign principal.318  
The agent must also disclose their activities, receipts, and disbursements that 
are in support of those activities.319  A willful violator may be subject to fines 
and imprisonment.320  If the violator is an alien, they may be subject to 
deportation.321  As the Cyber Digital Task Force Report states, “[o]vert 
influence efforts by foreign governments . . . may not be illegal, provided they 
comply with [FARA].”322  However, FARA also enables the government to 
watch companies that register as agents of foreign adversaries more closely 
by putting U.S. agencies on notice of their work. 
The DOJ has recently stepped up its enforcement efforts against entities 
that have not fulfilled their FARA obligations.323  The Department is now 
educating prosecutors and agents on how to investigate criminal violations 
of FARA, expanding outreach to those who may be required to register, and 
compelling registration of those who are not in compliance, including 
American agents of Russian state-funded media networks.324  However, 
FARA enforcement is historically difficult, given its numerous exceptions and 
the difficulty of navigating its broad language.325 
Furthermore, the Department has moved to pursue criminal cases.  It 
unsealed a criminal complaint of conspiracy on October 19, 2018, against 
Elena Alekseevna Khusyaynova, who is alleged to be the chief accountant of 
the Russian operations to influence the 2016 presidential election and 2018 
 
 317 See Fried & Polyakova, supra note 233, at 5 (discussing the DOJ’s attempt to register RT as such). 
 318 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–21 (2017).  
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midterm elections.326  The government claimed it had probable cause to 
believe that Ms. Khusyaynova violated a criminal conspiracy statute327 and 
obstructing enforcement of FARA and the Federal Election Campaign 
Act.328  The complaint was released three weeks before the 2018 midterm 
election, despite DOJ policy not to take major steps on politically sensitive 
matters just before an election.329  
FARA remains an avenue requiring legislative reform,330 including the 
need for DOJ’s National Security Division to have the authority to compel 
the production of records from registrants and updating the Act’s definition 
to cover the digital age.  Updating FARA is only part of ensuring 
transparency as to the identity of foreign agents. 
2.  Register and Regulate Bots 
Legislation to regulate bots can also help fight information warfare.  
Congress might consider laws making it illegal for bots to deceive people 
about their identity for the purposes of influencing elections.  California is 
leading the way in this area, passing a law in September of 2018 that makes 
it illegal for a person to use a bot:  
with the intent to mislead the other person about its artificial identity for the 
purpose of knowingly deceiving the person about the content of the 
communication in order to incentivize a purchase or sale of goods or services 
in a commercial transaction or to influence a vote in an election.  A person 
using a bot shall not be liable under this section if the person discloses that it 
is a bot.331 
The law further requires a disclosure that is “clear, conspicuous, and 
reasonably designed to inform persons with whom the bot communicates or 
interacts that it is a bot.”332  It does not impose a duty on service providers of 
 
 326 Victoria Clark et al., Russian Electoral Interference:  2018 Midterms Edition, LAWFARE (Oct. 19, 2018, 
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created by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. 
 331 2018 CAL. STAT. 92 (enacted).   
 332  Id. 
148 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:1 
   
 
online platforms, such as social media sites.  If successful, such bot disclosure 
laws would help avoid some source-credibility issues in misinformation 
campaigns.  However, it remains to be seen whether such laws can be 
enforced effectively in a rapidly changing online environment.  
Bot registration laws might be more effective.  A person using a bot to 
influence an electoral vote might have to register the bot to do so, alerting 
the government or the online platform to the bot’s presence and intended 
behavior.  Automated bots do not necessarily have First Amendment rights.  
However, when a person is behind the bot, First Amendment concerns may 
still be implicated in any surveillance of those bots.  Since humans control 
bots in varying degrees, with some bots nearly autonomous and others 
involving substantial human control, regulation of bots falls into a thorny 
constitutional gray zone. 
3.  Prosecute Operatives Who Target the Right to Vote 
The United States can also combat Russian information warfare by 
investigating and prosecuting operatives who seek to infringe upon U.S. 
citizens’ right to vote.  Congress can enact legislation criminalizing 
information campaigns that are designed to suppress the vote.  To ensure 
protection for freedom of speech, Congress must carefully define a standard 
for distinguishing information campaigns designed to suppress the vote from 
other political speech.  Congress should require proof of intent to suppress 
the vote and identification of a targeted group of voters whose vote a 
campaign is designed to suppress.  The Fifteenth Amendment, related 
constitutional amendments that support the right to vote, and the Voting 
Rights Act would support such legislation.333  The legislation would advance 
the compelling state interest of protecting the U.S. electoral process against 
foreign interference.  These constitutional amendments forbid state action 
that would suppress the right to vote, not private action.  However, state 
inaction that allowed suppression of the right to vote would run counter to 
the spirit of these amendments when such state action is possible. 
Criminalizing disinformation campaigns targeting the voting process 
would send a powerful signal to U.S. enemies and those acting on their 
behalf, including U.S. persons.  The existence of criminal laws against 
disinformation campaigns that target the right to vote may cause trolls and 
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others to refuse to participate in Russian disinformation campaigns.  
Sanctions on or punishment of those who disobey the laws will provide a 
further deterrent.  The existence of laws criminalizing private voter 
suppression would also signal to the American public that voter suppression 
will not be tolerated.  Such laws will also signal that the Federal Government 
seeks to encourage voting by African Americans and other historically 
marginalized groups.  If such encouragement increases voter turnout, 
democratic values will prevail over attempted foreign interference. 
4.  Employing and Improving Counterspeech 
As discussed above, the counterspeech doctrine rests on a shaky 
intellectual foundation when considering what we now know about human 
psychology and the modern marketplace of ideas.334  Since news consumers 
are likely unable to gauge the validity of the reporting properly, 
counterspeech may do little to ensure that truth prevails or improve the 
quality of democratic decision-making.335  
Counterspeech may still be a valuable tool in counterpropaganda efforts 
under certain conditions.  More research is needed to determine how best to 
muster government resources in support of useful counterspeech efforts to 
fight information warfare.  Also, the U.S. Government must be careful not 
to get into the business of determining what is true and what is false.  If 
disinformation exists about government programs themselves, the United 
States is free to refute it.  The government might counter falsities about access 
to elections or voter registration, for example.  However, if, for instance, fake 
news is being spread about political candidates, the government must not be 
the arbiter of whether that news is true or false so as not to censor speech.  
Based on the above analysis, U.S. counterspeech efforts should avoid the 
firehose approach and carefully target programs toward its audience.  The 
United States would do well to promote the importance of assessing the 
credibility of news sources and warn consumers before misinformation 
occurs or immediately thereafter.  This would help combat the problem of 
the resilience of first impressions.  The United States should also make and 
 
 334 See Ho & Schauer, supra note 103, at 1167–75 (examining human psychology and the marketplace 
of ideas).  See generally MARI J. MATSUDA, Public Response to Racist Speech:  Considering the Victim’s Story, 
in WORDS THAT WOUND:  CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 17, 48 (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993). 
 335 Napoli, supra note 1, at 82.  
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repeat public announcements dispelling political statements that are 
disinformation in order to make the public familiar with the truth.  However, 
the United States must be careful to frame its retractions in such a way as not 
to repeat an original false news story and breed familiarity with it.  The 
United States should also develop correct counternarratives after falsities are 
removed, both to elevate the truth and to ensure that consumers understand 
how to avoid falsehoods in the future.336  In engaging in this messaging, it is 
critical that the U.S. Government does so with attribution, so it is clear to 
recipients who is the source of information.337 
Most importantly, the United States must be proactive and work to stop 
information warfare at its source.338  The Pandora’s box of false news can 
cause irreparable damage from the moment it is opened.  Falsehoods may 
not even become entirely apparent until long after the speech is made and 
the damage is done. 
For this reason, counterspeech efforts must work toward removing the 
sources of false speech themselves.  Counterspeech efforts must focus on 
identifying, and training others to identify, fake news and fake news outlets 
and exposing or eradicating them.  Geltzer and Kupchan suggest a U.S. 
Government-sponsored “information campaign” to make the public aware 
of Russian information warfare.339  They argue that greater awareness that 
the Kremlin is deliberately seeking to pit Americans against themselves can 
help make the public less susceptible to manipulation.340  Similarly, Joseph 
Thai argues for a K–12 media literacy curriculum to teach students to 
evaluate the quality and credibility of sources.341  More research is needed to 
 
 336 Paul & Matthews, supra note 25, at 10.  
 337 The U.S. Government has always put forth its own messaging, with attribution, e.g., agency social 
media accounts and counter-messaging efforts abroad, per statutes like Smith-Mundt.  See, e.g., 22 
U.S.C. §§ 1431–1442(a) (2018). 
 338 Paul & Matthews, supra note 25, at 10. 
 339 Joshua Geltzer & Charles Kupchan, Opinion, What Counterterrorism Can Teach Us About Thwarting 
Russian Disinformation, WASH. POST:  DEMOCRACYPOST (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/02/22/what-counterterrorism-can-teach-us-about-th
warting-russian-disinformation/. 
 340 Id.  U.S. efforts to counter Soviet propaganda during the Cold War might be useful to draw on.  See 
generally Ashley Deeks et al., Addressing Russian Influence:  What Can We Learn From U.S. Cold War 
Counter-Propaganda Efforts?, LAWFARE (Oct. 25, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
addressing-russian-influence-what-can-we-learn-us-cold-war-counter-propaganda-efforts 
(discussing the range of strategies the U.S. used to combat Soviet propaganda).  
 341 Thai, supra note 68, at 319. 
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determine whether these efforts are effective at promoting a well-informed 
democratic populace.342  
a.  The Revised Smith-Mundt Act 
The United States recently modified its laws to allow the DOS to conduct 
more foreign-directed counterspeech.  Before 2012, the effectiveness of the 
U.S. Government’s response to disinformation campaigns was hindered by 
the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948,343 also called 
the Smith-Mundt Act.  Congress initially enacted the Smith-Mundt Act to 
counter the worldwide communist propaganda released by the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War.  It outlined the United States’ plan to “promote a 
better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase 
mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the 
people of other countries.”344  The Act permitted the U.S. Government to 
disseminate such messages abroad.345  However, the Act prohibited the 
dissemination of U.S. influence information to U.S. persons, or within the 
United States.346  As with the Privacy Act, Congress wanted to resist parallels 
drawn between Soviet propaganda efforts and U.S. actions.347  Therefore, 
Congress designed restrictions to prevent foreign-bound information from 
being distributed or accessible to the American public.348  
In 2012, Congress amended the Smith-Mundt Act, recognizing the 
impossibility of restricting Americans from accessing information designated 
for foreign audiences in the Internet age.  Congress removed the domestic 
dissemination ban, thereby allowing government material produced for 
overseas consumption to be made available to the American public.349  Both 
 
 342 See Lazer et al., supra note 27, at 1095 (discussing the “surprisingly few scientific answers” to 
questions about fake news and its impact); Timmer, supra note 297, at 705 (describing Facebook’s 
Journalism Project). 
 343 22 U.S.C. §§ 1431–1442(a) (2017). 
 344 Id. 
 345 Weston R. Sager, Note, Apple Pie Propaganda? The Smith-Mundt Act Before and After the Repeal of the 
Domestic Dissemination Ban, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 519 (2015).  
 346 See id. (arguing a de facto ban existed). 
 347 See Allen W. Palmer & Edward L. Carter, The Smith-Mundt Act’s Ban on Domestic Propaganda:  An 
Analysis of the Cold War Statute Limiting Access to Public Diplomacy, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 11 (2006) 
(quoting Senator Edward Zorinsky, “[t]he American taxpayer certainly does not need or want his 
tax dollars used to support U.S. Government propaganda”). 
 348 Sager, supra note 345, at 519.  
 349 Id. at 528.  
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the Senate and the House passed the amendment in late 2012,350 and on 
January 3, 2013, President Obama signed the legislation into law.351  
The amended Smith-Mundt Act provides the DOS with an improved 
tool to fight information warfare through counterspeech.  The DOS is now 
able to target diaspora communities susceptible to the anti-American 
propaganda streaming into the United States.352  The amendment was 
designed to include other checks to ensure that the U.S. Government still 
does not propagandize its people in a manner comparable to the former 
Soviet Union.353  While U.S. persons can now access and judge State-created 
propaganda, the DOS cannot aim to influence U.S. public opinion directly.  
For example, programming comes from the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors (“BBG”), which is independent of the DOS and known for its 
excellence in journalism.354  The DOS and the BBG specifically355 may not 
disseminate their materials to U.S. citizens on their own volition but may 
only make them “available” to those who wish to access them.356  The DOS 
and the BBG also may not create programming intended for a domestic 
audience or broadcast programming within the United States before 
disseminating it abroad.357  In other words, although the DOS and the BBG 
may broadcast their programming within the United States, the American 
people can be neither the intended nor the initial audience.358  The most 
meaningful restriction on the domestic dissemination is likely the DOS’s 
appropriations bill, which contains a provision prohibiting the agency from 
disseminating “propaganda” within the United States without the 
 
 350 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, H.R. 4310, 112th Cong. § 1078 (2013). 
 351 See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the President on H.R. 
4310 (Jan. 3, 2013) (announcing signature of the authorization act).   
 352 Rebecca A. Keller, Influence Operations and the Internet:  A 21st Century Issue 11 (Feb. 17, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript) (available at https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1018557.pdf). 
 353 See, e.g., Rosa Brooks, The Case for American Propaganda, FOREIGN POLICY (July 17, 2013, 10:35 PM), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/17/the-case-for-american-propaganda/. 
 354 BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS, BBG STRATEGIC PLAN 2018-2022, INFORMATION 
MATTERS:  IMPACT AND AGILITY IN U.S. INTERNATIONAL MEDIA (2018), https://www.usagm.
gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/BBG-Strategic-Plan-2018-2022_FINAL.pdf.  
 355 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, H.R. 4310, 112th Cong. § 1077 (2012). 
 356 Sager, supra note 345, at 529. 
 357 22 U.S.C. § 1461–1a(a) (2013) (clarifying that the DOS and the BBG cannot use funds “to influence 
public opinion in the United States”).  However, the DOS or BBG may communicate, “either 
directly or indirectly,” regardless of whether “a United States domestic audience is or may be 
thereby exposed to program material.”  Id. § 1461-1a(b). 
 358 Sager, supra note 345, at 532.  
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authorization of Congress.359  The United States Government 
Accountability Office defines propaganda as (1) self-aggrandizing, (2) purely 
partisan, or (3) covert.360  Critics argue that these restrictions are insufficient 
to ensure that U.S. persons are not propagandized.  For example, U.S. 
Government programs can easily be misappropriated and rebroadcast by 
individuals, regardless of the audience for which the programming was 
designed.361  
Moreover, even the most innocent DOS or BBG programming could be 
considered covert propaganda if, without congressional approval, it is 
“circulated as the ostensible position of parties outside the agency”362 
through “surreptitious means.”363  Therefore, if the unattributed 
programming is impossible to verify or activities merely influence public 
emotions, such as by placing the U.S. flag behind a government 
spokesperson, government agencies may legally distribute it.364  Scholar 
Weston Sager concludes that an agency violates the covert propaganda 
prohibition if the intended audience cannot ascertain the proper source of 
the government-produced materials.365 
The 2012 amendment to the Smith-Mundt Act was a necessary tool to 
allow the government to fight information warfare.  Given modern 
technology, any efforts by the U.S. Government to distribute information 
risk misappropriation.  The government will have to develop tactics, legal 
and otherwise, to avoid misappropriation of its propaganda.  It will also need 
to continue to comply with other restrictions on intelligence collection and 
privacy, as discussed above.  
 
 359 See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 7055, 125 Stat. 786, 1243–
44 (2011) (restricting any appropriation from the Act from being used for propaganda purposes 
without Congressional authorization).  
 360 KEVIN R. KOSAR, PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PROPAGANDA:  RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTIVE 
AGENCY ACTIVITIES 6 (2005); 1 OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 4-197 (3d ed. 2004) (describing how 
appropriation acts commonly prohibit the use of funds for propaganda, which is often defined 
“though administrative interpretation”). 
 361 Sager, supra note 345, at 532–33.  
 362 Id. (citing OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 348, at 4-202). 
 363 KOSAR, supra note 360, at 7.  
 364 Id.  
 365 Office of Nat’l Drug Control Pol., B-303495, 2005 WL 21443, at *4 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 4, 2005); 
Sager, supra note 333, at 534. 
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b.  Expanding Counterterror Counterspeech 
Some counterspeech efforts used to fight terror might be expanded to 
combat information warfare.  The State Department’s Global Engagement 
Center (“GEC”) was established in April 2016, under Executive Order 
13721.366  The GEC’s original mission was to track terrorist propaganda and 
disinformation, to develop consistent anti-terrorist messaging across 
government agencies, and to work with other governments and grassroots 
organizations to fight information warfare abroad.367  The Center used social 
media to micro-target users vulnerable to radicalization.368  
The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) expanded 
GEC’s mission to include countering the adverse effects of disinformation.369  
It also included a Privacy Act authorization for research and data analysis of 
foreign disinformation and communications.370  In 2016 and 2017, Congress 
authorized the GEC to receive $120 million under the respective NDAAs to 
coordinate government-wide efforts to counter Russian and Chinese 
propaganda.371  While the Center was underfunded during Rex Tillerson’s 
tenure as Secretary of State, bipartisan backlash pushed funding to the 
GEC.372  These funds have been dispersed to research disinformation tactics; 
support the counter-disinformation efforts of journalists, online influencers, 
 
 366 Exec. Order No. 13,721, 81 Fed. Reg.14,685 (Mar. 17, 2016). 
 367 Issie Lapowsky, The State Department’s Fumbled Fight Against Russian Propaganda, WIRED (Nov. 22, 
2017), https://www.wired.com/story/the-state-departments-fumbled-fight-against-russian-propa
ganda/.  
 368 Id.; see also Joby Warrick, How A U.S. Team Uses Facebook, Guerrilla Marketing to Peel Off Potential ISIS 
Recruits, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/bait-and-flip-us-team-uses-facebook-guerrilla-marketing-to-peel-off-potential-isis-recruits
/2017/02/03/431e19ba-e4e4-11e6-a547-5fb9411d332c_story.html (describing measures taken 
by the U.S. Government to use social media to combat extremism). 
 369 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2546, § 1287 
(2017). 
 370 Id. §1287(b)(10); see also Gardiner Harris, State Dept. Was Granted $120 Million to Fight Russian Meddling. 
It Has Spent $0, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/world/
europe/state-department-russia-global-engagement-center.html (describing the allocation of funds 
for fighting disinformation).  
 371 See Harris, supra note 370. 
 372 Robbier Gramer & Elias Groll, State Department Ramps Up War Against Foreign Propaganda, FOREIGN 
POLICY (Feb. 7, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/07/with-new-appointment-state-
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GEC); see also John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. 
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and fact-checkers; and develop new technology to combat disinformation.373  
The GEC’s impact remains to be seen. 
G.  Regulating Online Platforms and Social Media 
The Internet and social media platforms act as important fora for free 
speech and expression.  Accordingly, any attempts to regulate online 
platforms and social media will raise First Amendment concerns, despite 
their status as private entities.  Eric Posner goes so far as to assert that “any 
law that sought to blunt the force of Russian propaganda by controlling its 
distribution by Internet companies is unconstitutional.”374  He argues that 
because Supreme Court doctrine recognizes the right to receive information, 
free of government interference, censorship of Russian propaganda would 
not survive First Amendment scrutiny.  However, Posner concludes by 
suggesting that the 2016 election demonstrates the drawbacks of an 
“unfettered ‘marketplace of ideas.’”375  Although the United States must 
respond to the danger of Russian and terrorist propaganda on social media, 
constitutional law serves as an obstacle.  Despite the significant constitutional 
challenges involved, some government regulation of online platforms and 
social media may be permissible and appropriate to fight information 
warfare. 
1.  Hurdles to Regulating Online Platforms and Social Media 
Some scholars have proposed making social media companies liable for 
illegal content posted by their users.  David Howard, for example, has 
proposed holding information and social media companies responsible if 
their algorithms push false information for reasons of profit.376  He also 
proposes fining social media companies for knowingly failing to remove 
illegal content.377 
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However, such proposals raise several major constitutional concerns. 
One concern is that requiring online platforms to be responsible for the 
content of their users’ postings might qualify as collateral censorship.  The 
more the U.S. Government is entangled with voluntary self-regulation of 
online platforms, the more the First Amendment becomes an issue.  An 
online platform’s behavior might constitute state action in certain 
circumstances, and therefore raise obligations under the First 
Amendment.378  For example, in upholding online platform immunity under 
section 230 of the CDA,379 the Ninth Circuit recognized the congressional 
purpose as partly to serve as free speech protection for users.380  The court 
expressed concern with collateral censorship:  if the government threatens to 
hold an online platform liable and the online platform then censors its users, 
the government would be partially responsible for limiting users’ speech.381 
Imposing an obligation on social media companies for illegal content 
posted by its users would be radical in the context of prior Supreme Court 
precedent protecting both true and false speech.382  Few circumstances 
exist—and few should exist—in which the government is permitted to be the 
arbiter of what is true and what is false.  If the government requires social 
media companies to do so on its behalf, that will violate the First 
Amendment.  If social media companies operate independently to prohibit 
disinformation, the First Amendment is not implicated.  However, if the 
government imposed some standard of care on online platforms to help 
combat disinformation, that would be a gray constitutional area.  It could 
also be the beginning of a slippery slope with dangerous consequences for 
free speech.  Technology companies tend to be risk-averse, especially if 
 
 378 See Klonick, supra note 94, at 1611 (questioning whether the Packingham decision opens the door for 
argument that social media platforms “perform quasi-municipal functions”). 
 379 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2003). 
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to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and 
other interactive media; [and] (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently 
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation”).  
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government sanctions are at play.  Thus, holding social media companies 
liable for illegal content could lead to overbroad regulation or censorship of 
legitimate speech, especially political speech.383  
Additionally, upon receiving notice of the potentially illegitimate speech, 
the company would have to engage in the resource-intensive inquiry as for 
whether or not the speech must be taken down.  Censoring the speech would 
likely be less costly than being held liable, as not censoring allegedly illegal 
content may risk expensive litigation and adverse judgments.384  The fear of 
“whether [the truth] can be proved in court or . . . the expense of having to 
do so” would encourage such collateral censorship.385  
The spectrum of censorship arising from liability may range from 
mistakes to collateral censorship to even the prohibition of entire categories 
of speech on the site that produce higher risks of liability.386  It could also lead 
to chilling speech by social media users, who currently operate in an 
environment where they can freely post anything and have it instantaneously 
shared around the world.  If social media companies were to be held liable 
for their users’ speech, users might hesitate to post or shrink away from using 
social media.  Finally, such a policy could also undermine the concept that 
counterspeech is the primary solution to false speech, as advanced in Sullivan 
and Alvarez. 
2.  Avenues for Regulating Online Platforms and Social Media 
Requiring online platforms to act as censors is constitutionally 
problematic for other reasons.  Corporations, after all, have First 
Amendment rights of their own.387  The government would not be able to 
compel social media companies to advance its own message or restrict the 
speech of users on its behalf.  
 
 383 BENKLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 362; Jamie Fly et al., Fake News, Free Speech, and Foreign Influence:  
The Smart Way the U.S. Can Combat Disinformation, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Mar. 2018), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Disinformation-Brief-March-2018.pdf.  
 384 Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to Corrective Speech:  A New Test for Requiring Actual Malice, 
94 CAL. L. REV. 833, 858 n.172 (2006) (arguing that “preserving free speech online requires costly 
investigation, legal analysis, and uncertain liability,” if § 230 is read narrowly, which in turn suggests 
that “reasonable actors will immediately remove [flagged] speech without regard to the merits of 
the notification”). 
 385 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). 
 386 Vulnerable, unpopular speech is most at risk here. 
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However, some regulations on online platforms might be feasible.  Social 
media companies might be legally regulated as sellers of a customer service.  
Social media companies trumpet their ability to provide “community.”  In 
this sense, their services are much more akin to a gym or a café than to a 
media company.  The governance of these companies over their 
communities can be likened to the regulation of a corporate restaurant chain 
or chain of gyms.  Just like public accommodations can be regulated by the 
government to ensure that they do not violate the constitutional rights of 
those who are allowed inside, so too can social media.  Just like the 
government can restrict who buys a gun, so too can the government restrict 
who is allowed on social media sites.  And just like the government can police 
illegal activity in a private establishment, so too can it police illegal behavior 
on social media.  While access to social media may be difficult to restrict post-
Packingham, statutes narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest 
might be acceptable, so long as they do not burden more speech than 
necessary.  Packingham also may not apply to the rights of non-U.S. persons 
or bots to access social media. 
By regulating social media like other service providers, the government 
can solve some of the problems it has encountered in fighting information 
warfare.  Social media companies could be held liable for allowing their 
platforms to be used for activities that undermine the integrity of the voting 
process since voting is a constitutional right and an act of expression.  Any 
actions designed or motivated by the desire to suppress voter turnout would 
be of particular constitutional concern.  Social media companies might be 
required to notify the government of such activities, although such a 
requirement could be construed as compelling speech by those companies.  
The government can also require that social media companies be held liable 
if they knew or should have had reason to know that a user was trying to 
disrupt elections on their sites.  Narrowly tailored statutes targeted to the 
purpose of ensuring that social media users do not disrupt elections could 
allow the government to regulate social media constitutionally. 
Social media companies could be required to conduct verification checks 
for all users who wish to join their sites to determine whether they are humans 
or bots.  The government might also require users to regularly renew their 
verifications, perhaps randomly, and require repeated verifications for those 
who engage in behavior that suggests they are trying to disrupt elections.  
Social media companies could be held liable for failing to report bots who 
engage in activities disruptive to the electoral process.  
November 2019] THE NEW FIGHTING WORDS? 159 
   
 
Technology companies might also be required to notify their users and 
the U.S. Government that their sites are disseminating foreign 
propaganda.388  Further, social media websites might also be required to 
disseminate information to their users about spotting and reporting fake news 
and posts designed to disrupt the U.S. electoral process.  As discussed above, 
scholars have identified education campaigns about information warfare as 
an important part of the fight against it.  Social media companies could be 
required to disseminate information to their users upon joining a social 
network and at regular intervals before and during electoral cycles.  The 
government could require online platforms like Facebook and Google to 
provide specific information to its consumers to judge the materials posted.389  
If the online platform does not provide information, the online platform 
could be held liable for contempt or liable at a reckless standard.  Even if 
Congress cannot legislate such a requirement, the government might ask 
social media companies to educate their users voluntarily.  Reminding users 
of their important role in safeguarding the U.S. electoral process might 
generate a sense of online civic responsibility that would reinforce bonds 
within a social network, to which social media companies might subscribe.  
Facebook already regularly reminds its users to vote and to register to do so.  
Other scholars have suggested additional useful tactics for responding to 
the Russian disinformation threat.  Geltzer and Kupchan suggest adapting 
the framework of tracing and blocking terrorist financing to the current 
threat of information warfare.390  They suggest legislation that would 
criminalize the acceptance of assistance from a foreign government that is 
aimed at influencing elections.  For example, if a presidential candidate’s 
campaign manager affirmatively responded to a Kremlin email offering to 
wage a disinformation campaign targeting his opponent in the 2020 election, 
that would constitute a criminal act.  The goal would be to make social media 
companies and other sites more accountable, with a “know your source” 
requirement comparable to the “know your customer” requirement.391  
Howard argues that the government might also require online platforms to 
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modify their user agreements to limit disinformation, and to allow users to 
flag false or suspicious content.392 
The ambiguous First Amendment status of online platforms and social 
media providers presents challenges for regulating them without chilling 
speech and trammeling on First Amendment rights.  Legislation will be more 
likely to be constitutional if it puts the onus on users to safeguard their First 
Amendment rights, such as encouraging users to report suspected 
disinformation or requiring users to register bots. The more legislation puts 
the social media company in the position of a censor, the less likely it is to 
pass constitutional muster.  Requiring a social media company to report 
suspicious behavior by its users presents a constitutional gray area, so 
legislation in this regard must be very narrowly tailored. Regulating online 
platforms as a category of service providers similar to other providers of 
places of communal gathering might show the most potential for preventing 
false speech designed to disrupt the electoral process. 
3. “Voluntary” Actions by Online Platforms 
Because regulation of online platforms and social media outlets presents 
constitutional difficulties, and because of the need for rapid action to protect 
voters against disinformation, some have proposed that online platforms 
voluntarily take steps to combat information warfare.  Governments and the 
public have pushed social media platforms to voluntarily commit to actively 
policing their networks for fake news and disinformation, and to identify, 
label, and even suspend the botnets responsible for its creation and 
dissemination.  
Online platforms have financial incentives to cooperate with 
governments that regulate their businesses.  Voluntary compliance with 
government requests to help fight information warfare may help these 
companies avoid future regulation.  Moreover, online platforms are 
accountable to their users and responsive to user demands and political 
pressures.  Thus, online platforms have begun to take actions to combat 
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information warfare.  Political pressure393 and social responsibility394 have 
encouraged online platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Google, to alter 
their platforms to combat fake news.395 
Some commentators push for online platforms to serve as “de facto 
Internet police” because it is less costly and more efficient than for the 
government to do so.396  They have called for online platforms to monitor 
subscriber conduct, remove risky subscribers from the network, report 
instances of computer crime on their sites, build constraints that 
automatically monitor and prevent illegal activity, and preserve data for law 
enforcement investigation.397  However, all of these activities raise free 
speech concerns.  If online platforms begin to act as Big Brother, users’ 
speech will be chilled.  Moreover, private companies tend to be risk-averse.  
As described earlier, online platforms may err in favor of over-censorship 
because of the difficulties in distinguishing protected from unprotected 
speech.398  
The Federal Government could pressure online platforms to control the 
speech of their users through a “good corporate citizen” program, which 
requests online platforms to “voluntarily remove questionable content or 
alert government authorities to its existence.”399  Although the government 
lacks the legal authority to compel the removal of content, online platforms 
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may choose to remove content upon request instead of risking poor relations 
with the government.  For example, under the CDA, online platforms are 
immune from civil liability for any “Good Samaritan” blocking or screening 
of “objectionable” material.400 
Such actions by online platforms are complicated by the undefined legal 
status of online platforms, including social media websites, as media, service 
providers, and critical parts of the “new public square.”  Private companies 
ordinarily do not have First Amendment obligations toward their users.  
They certainly do not have a First Amendment burden to remove false and 
inciting speech.  However, social media websites have more power to censor 
and impose restrictions on speech than many governments.  Facebook can 
ban what it considers to be hate speech in its terms of service, but the U.S. 
Government cannot.  Scholars have thus argued that self-censorship by 
social media companies causes First Amendment concerns.  Some argue that 
social media platforms are a modern form of the press and, therefore, are 
generally protected by the First Amendment.401  To do otherwise would 
contravene the First Amendment because it would inhibit legitimate 
democratic discourse.402  Regardless of whether social media should be 
likened to the press, the public square, or something else entirely, the practice 
of censorship on social media “sits awkwardly” with traditional American 
values of open political debate and free expression.403  
Moreover, as noted above, social media sites function as communities 
with quasi-governmental structures.  They also provide important venues for 
free speech, expression, and discourse.  Collateral censorship concerns may 
be raised if online platforms engage in a quasi-government function.  A fine 
line may exist between censorship and voluntary action if the government 
puts strong pressure on online platforms to remove content against their will. 
For these reasons, any voluntary actions by online platforms should also 
comport with First Amendment principles.  Online platforms should 
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consider the primacy of political speech and the importance of political 
discourse on their platforms when considering any voluntary actions.   
Rather than attempting to regulate the truth, technology companies 
might endeavor to identify “when ‘news’ sources are confined to a very 
narrow group of self-referring sources—a hallmark of disinformation—so 
that users are aware that [content] may be suspect.”404  Online platforms 
would not necessarily seek to suspend or censor the accounts, but act to alert 
their users about the dangers and warning signs of disinformation and 
radicalization.  Clarifying the source of the material is in line with First 
Amendment principles as speaker identity can greatly impact trust factors, 
such as credibility, knowledge, motivation, and reliability.405  Furthermore, 
foreign nations do not possess First Amendment interests, so “compelling the 
disclosure of their identity would not impose any speaker-side harms to offset 
the benefits of disclosure to listeners.”406  
One promising, data-driven tactic for countering divisive propaganda is 
Google’s Jigsaw.  This project, premised on counterspeech, was initially 
developed to thwart terrorist communications.407  Jigsaw redirects YouTube 
users who search for radicalizing content toward persuasive, “user-created, 
de-radicalizing content.”408  The benefits of this approach are several-fold.  
First, consumers perceive online platform content as more authentic than 
U.S. Government messages.409  Second, the data-driven approach can better 
identify hidden, counter-argument content410 that resembles propaganda but 
was not designed to do so directly.  Examples might include citizen 
journalism and documentaries and content featuring religious figures who 
refute extremist narratives.411  Third, these approaches do not depend on the 
government’s ability to apply regional, linguistic, cultural, or religious 
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expertise to determine the credibility of messages.  Instead, real-world user 
behavior can be used to determine which messages are persuasive at 
radicalization or counter-radicalization.412  Other data-driven projects, such 
as those run by Graphika, Oxford University’s Computational Propaganda 
Project, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, YouTube’s 
AlgoTransparency, and Public Editor, are helpful in tracking and exposing 
disinformation that social media companies can remove.413  
Flagging and the voluntary removal of content as an avenue to counter 
propaganda may be more coercive to users than countermessaging or 
redirection, but would better conform to First Amendment requirements and 
be more palatable to the companies’ user bases.414  However, social media 
companies run a similar credibility risk to that faced by the government.  
Social media corporations’ use of their users’ data and psychological profiling 
has caused many traditional media outlets, researchers, and users to view 
their editorial interventions with skepticism.415  
Another solution that social media companies are currently trying is 
signaling source quality.  Facebook, for example, has begun to surface fact-
checked articles next to disputed ones,416 add “trust indicators” to include 
information about the publication, corrections, and ethics policies,417 and 
crowdsourced the trust rankings of news sources to its userbase.418  Some 
social media sites have also excluded bot activity from measures of “trending” 
content.419  Platforms have also tried limiting bots and “cyborgs” from 
spreading news.420  Although malign actors may be able to design 
countermeasures to these efforts, social media companies will have incentives 
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to keep combatting them if users value the credibility of their chosen 
platforms.  These are positive steps, but more research is needed to evaluate 
their effectiveness.  
The government can carefully pressure social media companies to 
provide an editorial function in regulating what is allowed on the sites, 
although these actions raise a concern of censorship.  The government 
employed such tactics in combatting foreign terrorist groups.  The DOJ’s 
Cyber Digital Task Force Report foresees the FBI assisting in providers’ 
voluntary efforts to identify and combat malign foreign influence operations, 
just as it has in addressing terrorist use of social media.421  Upon government 
request, in many of their “Terms of Service,” online platforms explicitly 
prohibit posts promoting violent or terrorist acts.  The government has 
pressured social media companies to police their users’ accounts for terrorist-
related activity.422  Social media companies have thus taken some editorial 
control via terms of service or user agreements that allow them to remove 
posts or delete accounts of terrorists or their supporters.423  Some 
corporations, like Twitter, have suspended or blocked hundreds of thousands 
of terrorist accounts—often before their first post.424  Suspending pro-
extremist social media accounts does not appear to sufficiently prevent new, 
pro-extremist group accounts from sprouting up.425  But, although the 
terrorists may quickly recreate the accounts, these “returning accounts” do 
not regain their previous level of traction.  From February 2016 to March 
2017, there was a dramatic decline of 76% in the number of tweets from 
English-language Islamic State sympathizers “from the most active to the 
least active week.”426  The policy of suspending accounts, however, may have 
other problems.  Beyond free speech issues and the loss of intelligence 
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gathering opportunities, suspensions may cause further radicalization by 
pushing extremists into insular online communities without moderate voices.  
Similar efforts by online platforms, whether coerced or voluntary, might 
be useful in combatting information warfare.  However, they make the online 
platform, not the consumer of information, the arbiter of truth.  Although 
such actions may not violate First Amendment freedoms, they raise concerns 
about chilling speech and censorship that run contrary to First Amendment 
ideals. 
4.  The Utility of Self-Regulation? 
As a tool for combatting information warfare, voluntary self-regulation 
by online platforms has many inherent flaws.  Online platforms’ efforts to 
remove posts or cooperate are likely to be inconsistent.427  Voluntary self-
regulation depends on the willingness of those at the helm of a social media 
company at any given time to comply.  New social media companies sprout 
up rapidly, making it difficult for the government to work with all of them.  
Smaller companies may not have the capacity to monitor users’ accounts 
closely.  Self-regulation also raises the problem of the proverbial fox guarding 
the henhouse.  Social media companies have every incentive to look like they 
are cooperating with the government while plausibly claiming deniability 
when their users misbehave.  Private companies do not provide U.S. persons 
with the same procedural safeguards and transparency as the government 
would require for infringement on speech.428  Encouraging companies to 
censor content without any form of due process removes transparency and 
could chill speech. 
More research is needed to determine the conditions under which 
voluntary self-regulation by online platforms and their users can fight 
information warfare.  For example, a recent study reported in the New York 
Times revealed that most users were unable to distinguish Russian fake news 
postings from real political advertisements, although trained online platform 
and social media employees might do better.429  Government guidelines for 
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good corporate citizenship by social media companies and their users would 
be a good start to combatting information warfare but would be insufficient 
on their own.   
CONCLUSION 
The First Amendment protects the most hallowed of American freedoms.  
However, information warfare has weaponized free speech against us.  
Adversaries of the United States have taken advantage of our prized freedom 
of speech and used it to undermine our electoral process, the very foundation 
of democracy itself.  To fight against information warfare, the U.S. 
Government is faced with a paradox:  while our enemies enjoy and exploit 
our citizens’ right to free speech, Congress may need to restrict the freedom 
of speech of Americans to fight our enemies’ speech.  Congress and 
administrative agencies must tread carefully to avoid unduly restricting First 
Amendment freedoms in the name of national security.  Allowing our 
adversaries to enjoy First Amendment freedoms—while Americans truly 
cannot—would help our enemies win.  
Faced with the enormous challenge of balancing the First Amendment 
with national security concerns, the United States has passed little legislation 
and issued few regulations to fight information warfare, especially as related 
to elections.  Several bills to enhance U.S. Government efforts to combat 
information warfare are currently stalled in Congress, in part due to concerns 
about their lack of adequate procedural and constitutional safeguards.430  
Meanwhile, the threat increases, as Russia continues its information warfare 
campaigns with unparalleled speed.  Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China 
are continuing to develop information warfare programs.  U.S. inaction to 
combat them will likely encourage other foreign governments to engage in 
similar influence operations. 
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This Article outlines what must be done to reform U.S. laws to fight 
information warfare.  A whole-of-government approach, involving the 
Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, the military, the intelligence 
community, and other civilian agencies, is necessary to fight it.  The work of 
these agencies is governed by a patchwork of laws that needs to be reformed, 
synthesized, and harmonized with the United States’ commitment to free 
speech and other civil liberties.  Legal reconceptions of First Amendment 
doctrine, privacy, and the role of the Internet and social media in society are 
necessary to combat information warfare effectively.  
This Article’s analysis of U.S. laws governing information warfare 
presents implications for how the U.S. military may conduct information 
operations abroad.  Military information and cyber operations are covered 
by a separate and overlapping legal framework than that discussed above, 
reflecting the differing requirements of kinetic warfare, other operations 
abroad, the law of armed conflict, international law, and sometimes covert 
operations.  However, military operations must conform to constitutional 
principles and many other domestic laws and policies of the United States.  
Even though military operations are within the purview of the Executive 
Branch, their constitutional validity may rest on congressional approval or 
limitations.  The court of public opinion, which is increasingly important in 
military operations, is also concerned with constitutional liberties. 
Furthermore, military information operations may produce collateral 
effects that affect U.S. nationals and involve the functioning of online 
platforms, especially if they are subject to a cyber intrusion.431  Perhaps most 
importantly, military operations increasingly rely on a whole-of-government 
approach, in which the military works closely with other government 
agencies to coordinate a unified fight against a foreign adversary.  Thus, the 
analysis above may be useful to the DOD in planning future military efforts 
to fight information warfare.  
The information warfare threat leads to a clash between two values that 
are fundamental to American society:  freedom of speech and free-and-fair 
elections.  Both ideals are grounded in the First Amendment, which has 
traditionally protected political speech above all forms of expression.  The 
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environment in which political speech is made and received is vastly different 
from the original Millian conception of the marketplace of ideas.  So much 
speech now floods the marketplace that little can be heard at all.  Some 
speakers can shout more loudly and rapidly than others due to 
mechanization.  Shopper-listeners lock themselves in echo chambers 
alongside only customers of similar views.  The flood of so much information 
into the marketplace at once, plus the poor acoustic conditions, make it 
difficult for true speech to be heard over falsities.  
In this new speech environment, courts should be more concerned with 
the validity and intent of political speech than the availability of that speech.  
Deciding what speech is and what speech is not “political” is dangerous 
territory for the government.  Instead, legislators and courts should take a 
narrower approach, focusing on speech made by foreign individuals and 
foreign agents in the electoral context.  They can also act to protect the 
fundamental constitutional right to vote and the electoral process that 
surrounds it.  Just as importantly, courts can recognize social media 
companies for the unique entities that they are: part press, part service 
provider, and part corporate governance entity.  Legislators may also 
regulate social media companies accordingly. 
Besides intelligence collection, more academic research on information 
warfare is desperately needed to make the combat effort effective.  Research 
is needed to understand the nature of information warfare, to predict how it 
will develop, and to develop countertactics and operations accordingly.  
Fourth Amendment concerns with protecting Americans against 
unreasonable search and seizure must also be fully explored.  Experiments 
are needed to determine what tactics will work to fight information warfare, 
and under which conditions.  Research is also necessary to determine who is 
susceptible to information warfare.  Academics, government, and social 
media providers must cooperate to achieve a holistic picture of the 
information battlefield.  Further research is critical to assess the impact of 
disinformation campaigns on U.S. elections.  Without clarifying the extent 
or nature of the harm caused by disinformation campaigns, government 
agencies may find it difficult to attract resources or develop effective 
programs to combat the threat.  
Disinformation threatens the existence of a well-informed public, and 
therefore, democracy itself.  As Justice Robert Jackson aptly noted, the 
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Constitution should not be “a suicide pact.”432  Likewise, the United States 
should not fall on the First Amendment’s double-edged sword.  The time has 
come for courts to reaffirm the primacy of political speech by protecting it 
from foreign information operations.  Nothing less than the meaning of the 
First Amendment, the right to privacy, and the foundations of American 
democracy are at stake.  
 
 
 432 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
